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Abstract 
 
 
The 2008 economic crisis brought an increasing support for some Western 
European radical left parties (RLPs) and renewed academic attention to this 
party family. Still, there is a lack of empirical knowledge on the ideological 
differences among RLPs – particularly across countries and regions. The 
present work conducts for the first time a systematic and direct cross-regional 
comparison of the ideological differences between RLPs from two different 
European regions (Nordic and Southern European countries). Manifesto and 
expert survey data are used for measuring and comparing party positions along 
several ideological dimensions and to evaluate to what extent a region-based 
ideological classification of RLPs finds empirical support. The results show that 
while some important ideological differences are found between Nordic and 
Southern European RLPs, these do not appear to be significant enough to 
classify them into two distinct ideological subgroups. Moreover, the results also 
suggest that, to compare the ideological differences between RLPs, we need 
more precise empirical instruments adapted to the study of its most 
characteristic ideological traits. 
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Resumo 
 
A crise económica de 2008 trouxe um crescente apoio a alguns partidos da 
esquerda radical (PER) da Europa Ocidental e uma renovada atenção 
académica a esta família partidária. Contudo, existe ainda uma falta de 
conhecimento empírico sobre as diferenças ideológicas entre os PER – 
particularmente entre países e regiões. O presente trabalho conduz pela 
primeira vez uma comparação sistemática e direta das diferenças ideológicas 
entre PER de duas diferentes regiões europeias (os países nórdicos e do Sul 
da Europa). Dados de manifestos eleitorais e inquéritos a especialistas são 
usados para medir e comparar as posições dos partidos em várias dimensões 
ideológicas e avaliar até que ponto uma classificação ideológica regional de 
PER encontra suporte empírico. Os resultados mostram que, embora sejam 
encontradas algumas diferenças ideológicas importantes entre os PER 
nórdicos e do Sul da Europa, estas não parecem ser suficientemente 
significativas para os classificar em dois subgrupos ideológicos distintos. Além 
disso, os resultados sugerem também que, para comparar as diferenças 
ideológicas entre PER, são necessários instrumentos empíricos mais precisos 
e adaptados ao estudo dos seus traços ideológicos mais característicos. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
The 2008 economic crisis brought an increasing support for some Western 
European radical left parties (RLPs) and renewed academic attention to this party family. 
Even though they have been in decline in several Northern European countries (Eskelinen, 
2015), there was a popularity surge for RLPs in the countries most affected by the crisis: 
from the Greek government of SYRIZA (Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás, Coalition of 
the Radical Left), to the Portuguese Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda, BE) or the Spanish 
protest movement-based Podemos (We Can). In the 2014 European parliament elections, 
the European United Left/Nordic Green Left group1 (GUE/NGL) increased its vote share 
from 4.8% to 6.4% and elected an all-time maximum of 52 MEPs. However, and despite 
this new relevance, RLPs are still under-researched from an academic point of view when 
compared to other niche parties such as the greens or the radical right (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 
2; March, 2011, p. 4). 
This renewed interest on RLPs has resulted in a series of new studies. But as March 
notes (2011, p. 4), most of these studies have been “single country studies or limited cross-
country comparisons” (see, for example, Damiani & De Luca, 2016; Dunphy & Bale, 
2007; Mudde, 2017; Ramiro & Verge, 2013), or focus on single aspects such as 
government participation (viz. Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Dunphy & Bale, 2011), 
Euroscepticism (Charalambous, 2011) or electoral support (e.g. Beaudonnet & Gomez, 
2016; March & Rommerskirchen, 2015). Other important features, such as the study of 
their ideological differences (Gomez, Morales, & Ramiro, 2016, p. 369) or how their 
“(ideological and strategic) positions differ across countries and regions” (March, 2011, p. 
7), have received considerably less attention. Few studies have actually attempted to 
address this gap. Some notable exceptions are the works of March (2011), Gomez et al. 
(2016) and Fagerholm (2016). Nevertheless, this remains a largely unexplored field of 
																																																						
1 The GUE/NGL is the group of radical left parties in the European parliament. 
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study and, to the best of our knowledge, no study has yet attempted to perform a direct 
cross-regional ideological comparison between RLPs from two different European regions. 
The aim of this dissertation is thus to address the lack of empirical knowledge on 
the ideological differences among RLPs and across European regions, by performing a 
comparative study between Nordic and Southern European RLPs. Nordic and Southern 
European countries are two of the regions where differences between RLPs have been 
acknowledged: Nordic radical left parties (NRLPs) are often described as being more 
pragmatic (March, 2011, pp. 95–96), de-radicalized (Eskelinen, 2015; Fagerholm, 2016) 
and willing to participate in government (Bale & Dunphy, 2011; March, 2011, pp. 95–96), 
than the more radical and “street-protest-oriented” Southern European radical left parties 
(SRLPs) (Eskelinen, 2015). However, the extent to which these translate into significant 
ideological differences and allow for a distinct classification of these two region-based 
groups of RLPs has not been empirically addressed. 
We therefore examine the ideological positions of RLPs from Nordic and Southern 
European countries in a comparative perspective, since the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989). 
This empirical analysis uses electoral manifesto (Comparative Manifesto Project, CMP) 
and expert survey data (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, CHES) for measuring and comparing 
party positions (issue positions) on the most relevant ideological dimensions of the 
European political space. In addition, complementary analysis is made on the relevance 
given by RLPs to different policy issues (issue salience). We extend the existing literature 
by using the latest up-to-date databases and by integrating data from the new emerging 
RLPs that are yet to be included in this kind of studies (e.g. Podemos and the Italian Left 
Ecology Freedom – Sinistra Ecologia Libertà, SEL2). By doing this, we expect to answer 
our main research question – are there two different ideological subgroups of radical left 
parties, a Nordic and a Southern European one? – and give an important contribution for 
the comparative study of European RLPs parties, following recent work by March (2011), 
Gomez et al. (2016) and Fagerholm (2016). 
This dissertation starts with an overview of the European radical left and the 
reasons why it deserves fresh academic attention (Chapter 2). The same chapter describes 
the diversity within this party family and explains why Nordic and Southern European 
																																																						
2 In December 2016, the SEL dissolved into a new radical left party – Sinistra Italiana (SI, Italian Left) – but 
played a major role in the Italian radical left between 2009 and 2016, having run for several legislative and 
European elections. 
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RLPs are a good case study for such a cross-regional comparison. Then, a brief review of 
the recent research on RLPs is made and a framework for the study of political parties’ 
ideological positions is presented, with several theoretical hypotheses to distinguish 
between Nordic and Southern European RLPs being developed (Chapter 3). The 
methodological chapter (Chapter 4) describes and critically discusses the data, methods 
and measurements used in our study. In the discussion of results (Chapter 5), we present a 
descriptive analysis of the disaggregated data, followed by the presentation of our 
statistical analysis and the comparison between the aggregate results for each RLPs group, 
explaining how these answer our main research question. Finally, we conclude by briefly 
reflecting on the implications of our study to the future research agenda on RLPs (Chapter 
6). 
Overall, the main conclusions of this dissertation can be described as two-fold. 
First, we show that while some important ideological differences are found between 
Nordic and Southern European RLPs, they do not appear to be significant enough for a 
classification of these parties in two distinct region-based ideological subgroups. Second, 
in order to measure the ideological differences within this party family, we can not use the 
instruments commonly used to compare different party families in the same way, since a 
comparison between RLPs seems to require finer instruments to look more closely at its 
most characteristic ideological traits. 
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Chapter 2 
Radical Left Parties: Nordic and Southern Europe 
as a case study 
 
 
The study of the ideological differences between RLPs – especially “across 
countries and regions” – remains an important gap of the literature about this party family. 
In this chapter, an explanation is given as to why Nordic and Southern European countries 
provide the interesting context for a comparative study on RLPs’ ideological differences 
and how this can be helpful in addressing some of the existing gaps on the radical left’s 
literature. In the following pages, a brief characterization of the European radical left is 
provided, as well as its current political agenda and how this parties recently earned a new 
academic attention. Then, a description is made on the existing diversity within RLPs, the 
several classifications that have been developed over the years and the knowledge gaps 
that still exist nowadays on their ideological differences. Finally, a closer look is given to 
Nordic and Southern European RLPs and to what is known about their main ideological 
characteristics. But first, we should start by answering to the following question: what is 
then the European radical left? 
 
 
2.1. The European radical left 
 
The radical left is a political family defined as being “to the left of” social 
democracy (March, 2011, p. 1) and opposing the current social, economic and political 
status quo. In his seminal work, March (2011) characterizes RLPs by their rejection of the 
“socio-economic structure of contemporary capitalism”, along with the promotion of 
“collective economic and social rights” and radical wealth redistribution (pp. 8–9). RLPs’ 
critique of neoliberal capitalism ranges from a strong anti-capitalist rhetoric to a more 
reformist neo-Keynesian approach (Amini, 2015, p. 12; March & Rommerskirchen, 2015, 
p. 41) that puts them to the left of the social democrats (SDs) and the greens (Gomez et al., 
  5	
2016, p. 353). But despite being critical of certain aspects of liberal democracy and 
demanding systemic change, most RLPs are nonetheless pro-democratic forces that 
advocate for a more participatory democracy (March, 2011, pp. 10–11). 
The characteristics of the contemporary radical left, however, to be better 
understood, must be seen in the light of its historical past and that of the political 
movements that originated it. Moreover, recent political events such as the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the alterglobal movement and the Great Recession have had a major impact in 
the landscape of the European radical left, shaping their political agenda and bringing them 
an unexpected new public and academic attention. 
 
From the Russian Revolution to the post-communist era 
 The origins of RLPs in Europe trace back to the divisions in the international 
socialist movement of the 1910s. The conflict between its moderate and radical wings over 
World War I and the Russian Revolution of 1917 ultimately led to a split into two distinct 
political families – the social democrats and the communists – and the formation of the 
first communist parties (Chiocchetti, 2017, pp. 29–32). Some decades later, the radical 
movements of the 1960s – and the spirit of May 68 – would activate “the political and 
intellectual universe of radicalism” that inspired a new wave of “New Left and Left 
Socialist” parties, created in rupture both with social democratic and traditional communist 
parties (Cardina & Soeiro, 2014). These two “waves of party formation” gave origin to the 
predecessors of most RLPs that exist today (Gomez et al., 2016, p. 352). 
The collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989-91 was another decisive historical moment 
for the European radical left. The fall of the Berlin Wall and of the communist regimes had 
an earthquake-like effect on RLPs – especially to the communists – leading to an identity 
crisis and a decline in support that forced them to begin a new phase of reconstruction 
(Chiocchetti, 2017, pp. 60–63). In the late 1990s, the landscape of the European radical left 
had significantly changed. Some minor parties dissolved (e.g. the Communist Party of 
Great Britain, CPGB) or became almost irrelevant (e.g. the Communist Party of Norway – 
Norges Kommunistiske Parti, NKP), while other switched to distinct party families, like 
the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) who abandoned its 
communist identity and fully transformed into a social democratic party, the Democratic 
Party of the Left (Partito Democratico Della Sinistra, PDS). 
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Many of these parties also abandoned their communist identity but reinvented 
instead as non-communist RLPs, like the Finnish Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto, VAS) or 
the Swedish Left Party (Vänsterpartiet, V) – rebranded from the Finnish SKDL (People’s 
Democratic League) and the Swedish VPK (Left Party – the Communists), respectively. 
Other RLPs resulted from the merger between old radical left groups (e.g. the Portuguese 
Left Bloc; the Danish Red-Green Alliance – Enhedslisten De Rød-Grønne, EL) or from 
alliances of old RLPs with dissidents from social democracy (e.g. the French Front de 
Gauche and the German Die Linke) (Chiocchetti, 2017, pp. 62–63; March, 2011, pp. 45–
46). This reconfiguration also had the important contribution of the alterglobal movement 
of the late 1990s as it opened the political space for a strong reaction against neoliberal 
globalization – around the slogan “Another world is possible” – and brought together a 
galaxy of activists (environmentalists, trade unionists, students, peasants, etc.) and political 
demands that would re-shape RLPs’ policy agenda and relationship with social movements 
(Cardina & Soeiro, 2014, pp. 36–37; March, 2011, p. 6). 
 Thus, although many thought RLPs would become irrelevant after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and of the Soviet Union (March & Mudde, 2005), several were able to adapt to 
the post-communist era and became part of an important European party family 
(Chiocchetti, 2017; Dunphy & March, 2013; Keith & March, 2016; March, 2011; March & 
Rommerskirchen, 2015). In the last two decades, RLPs managed to stabilize their levels of 
electoral support (March, 2011, p. 4), participated in several government experiences (e.g. 
Finland, France, Iceland, Italy) and attracted a new generation of political activists and 
voters (Eskelinen, 2015, pp. 121–123; Ramiro, 2016). New RLPs were even created with 
remarkable success (e.g. Podemos in Spain). These RLPs eventually helped “transcend the 
old division of the left” between social democratic, communist and green parties (Dunphy 
& Bale, 2011, p. 489), and brought new forms of organization (e.g. the movement party – 
Kitschelt, 2006), new ties with civil society (Tsakatika & Lisi, 2013) and – perhaps most 
importantly – new issues to the political agenda (Cardina & Soeiro, 2014). 
 
Current political agenda 
 Over the last two decades, the political agenda of RLPs has mostly focused on the 
opposition to welfare state retrenchment (e.g. privatization of public services, cuts in social 
security) and the protection of workers’ rights (March, 2011, pp. 201–203). New 
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politics/post-materialist issues (Inglehart, 1990; Knutsen, 1988), such as minorities’ rights, 
environmental protection and feminism, have also been embraced and became an 
important part of their “progressive social agenda” (Amini, 2015, p. 12; March, 2011, pp. 
18, 95). RLPs value extra-parliamentary activism and linkage to civil society groups, as 
they try to preserve and nurture their ties with trade unions and social movements, as part 
of their fight for “long-term transformation” of society (Dunphy & Bale, 2011, pp. 490, 
497; Tsakatika & Eleftheriou, 2013; Tsakatika & Lisi, 2013). 
At the international level, RLPs joined efforts fighting against international free 
trade agreements (e.g. TTIP – Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, CETA – 
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement), military interventions 
(NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the role of “neoliberal” financial 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the European Central Bank 
(ECB) (Amini, 2015, p. 24; March, 2011, p. 202). But even though these parties see the 
European Union (EU) as a stronghold for neoliberal policies and have traditionally 
opposed to the process of European integration, most RLPs have moderated their positions 
over the years and now seek for a change within the European institutional framework 
(Charalambous, 2011). 
Some of the issues that occupy the political discourse of contemporary RLPs have 
been relegated to the margins of the political discussion for years. However, they were 
brought to the heart of the political debate as RLPs have been conquering, in the last 
decade, a new relevance in the European political space and a renewed public and 
academic interest. 
 
New political and academic relevance 
 The 2008 economic crisis seems to have been a “turning point” for much of the 
European radical left and its anti-austerity/“anti-neoliberal” agenda (Tsakatika & Lisi, 
2013, p. 5). In 2017, RLPs seemed to have become more relevant than ever: in addition to 
having reached an all-time maximum support in the 2014 European elections, they were 
part of new government solutions in countries like Greece (major cabinet party, SYRIZA) 
or Portugal (parliamentary support parties, the Left Bloc and the Portuguese Communist 
Party – Partido Comunista Português, PCP), and achieved strong national representation 
in countries like Spain or Iceland, where the Icelandic Left-Green Movement 
  8	
(Vinstrihreyfingin-grænt framboð, VG) became the major opposition party in parliament3. 
On the other hand, in countries like Italy or Norway, RLPs did not capitalize on the new 
political context and other populist/anti-establishment parties emerged. In this context, it is 
also important to refer the unexpected success of some individual figures coming from the 
left-wing of the social democratic camp. The enthusiasm around UK’s Labour Party new 
leader – Jeremy Corbyn – or the 2016 US Democratic presidential primary candidate – 
Senator Bernie Sanders – can also be a symptom of a new relevance for left-wing 
radicalism. 
 Being considered an under-researched party family, we should give some 
justification as to why radical left parties deserve new public and academic attention. 
March & Rommerskirchen (2015) have recently summarized four main reasons for the 
study of RLPs: first, unequal attention has been given to RLPs when compared to other 
party families with approximate levels of electoral support (e.g. the radical right, the 
greens); second – and as noted above – the influence of European RLPs in government has 
significantly increased over the years; third, the Great Recession has provided fertile 
political ground for the success of more radical parties from all sides of the political 
spectrum; and finally, there are still significant gaps in the literature on European RLPs (p. 
41). To these four, we would add an additional one: in some countries (e.g. Greece, 
Iceland), it looks like RLPs are on the brink of occupying the empty space left by the 
collapse of center-left/social democratic parties as the major left-wing forces of their 
respective party systems. In addition, with the euro crisis, Brexit and the rise of populist 
and anti-EU parties, there has been an ongoing debate about an alleged failure of the 
European project and – more broadly – a “capitalism crisis” (Mason, 2016) that would fit 
the radical left’s call for an alternative socio-economic structure. 
 
 
2.2. The diversity among European RLPs 
 
 The European radical left has established itself as a “relatively distinct and 
coherent political space to the left of the socialist and green party families” (Chiocchetti, 
2017, pp. 9–11). But despite sharing a common political identity and being now considered 
																																																						
3 Expressive results of RLPs can also be found in the Netherlands, Germany or Ireland. 
  9	
a consolidated party family, there is still a great diversity among RLPs with several 
typologies and classifications having been developed. RLPs can differ in aspects such as 
their historical background, ideological positions, party organization, ties with civil society 
or government experience. And the study of the ideological diversity among these parties 
is still – as we have highlighted – one of the important gaps in the literature on RLPs. 
 
Ideological positions 
 We have already mentioned some of the origins of the contemporary RLPs, with 
some having departed from their traditional principles and reinvented themselves to a 
certain extent, and others being the result of alliances between other pre-existent left-wing 
political forces. But from an ideological perspective, RLPs can range from the orthodox 
Marxism-Leninism of the Greek and Portuguese communist parties – KKE (Communist 
Party of Greece, Kommounistická Kómma Elládas) and PCP – to the non-dogmatic 
socialism of the Nordic radical left (March, 2011, pp. 18–19). RLPs have also adopted new 
politics values in different degrees (Fagerholm, 2016; Gomez et al., 2016): while some 
embraced and combined post-materialist issues in their discourse (e.g. most Western 
European RLPs), others preferred to preserve the traditional socioeconomic and materialist 
issues of the old radical left (e.g. orthodox communist parties – Gomez et al., 2016). Their 
attitude towards the process of European integration and the EU is also an important 
source of variety among them. We can find the so-called Eurorejects who advocate for an 
EU withdrawal – like the orthodox communist parties and the Swedish V – but also more 
moderate Eurosceptic RLPs who do not oppose further international integration but simply 
the “neoliberal” nature of it – the German Die Linke or the Finnish VAS (Charalambous, 
2011). These “fundamental ideological/strategic disagreements” are also reflected in a 
differentiated participation in the international cooperation groups of the European radical 
left, namely the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left 
(GUE/NGL) and the Party of the European Left (PEL), weakening the ability of these 
groups “to influence politics across the EU” (Dunphy & March, 2013, p. 535).  
 
Organization and government participation 
 In terms of party organization, the radical left combines parties with the “old” 
democratic centralism organization and procedures – i.e. “eradication of open internal 
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party dissent and concentration of power in the hands of the party oligarchy” (Dunphy & 
Bale, 2007, p. 290) – and a more open and dynamic movement party-like structure 
(Kitschelt, 2006; Lisi, 2009), “a specific type of political organization half way between a 
party and a social movement” (Damiani, 2011, p. 379). Close articulation with civil society 
is an important part of RLPs extra-institutional activity, even if some parties favor 
cooperation with more traditional actors like trade unions, than with the new “inorganic” 
social movements of which some RLPs are somewhat suspicious (Lisi, 2013; Tsakatika & 
Eleftheriou, 2013; Tsakatika & Lisi, 2013).  
 RLPs have also been differently available for participating in government 
experiences, especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall. They have participated in cabinet 
governments in countries like Cyprus, Finland or Norway, and given parliamentary support 
in Denmark or Sweden (Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Dunphy & Bale, 2011; Olsen, Hough, & 
Kob, 2010). The novelty in this matter are the recent government experiences in countries 
where these parties have been traditionally averse to any compromise with social 
democratic parties (BE and PCP in Portugal) or had not previously been the most voted 
parties in legislative elections (SYRIZA in Greece). In a way, this has somewhat 
challenged the public perception of RLPs as mere “protest parties” unwilling to assume 
any kind of governmental responsibilities. However, whether this strategic change is 
lasting or merely contextual will have to be confirmed in the coming years, as well as its 
eventual consequences for the ideological matrix of these parties. 
 
Typologies and classifications of RLPs 
 The need to address the ideological diversity among RLPs has led to the 
development of several typologies and classifications (Backes & Moreau, 2008; Botella & 
Ramiro, 2003). March (2011, pp. 18–20) classifies RLPs in five distinct subgroups based 
on “ideological affinities”: conservative communists, reformist communists, democratic 
socialists, populist socialists and social populists. Conservative communist parties are 
“relatively uncritical” of the Soviet experience and try to “conserve” their traditions, 
Marxist-Leninist principles and modes of organization (e.g. the Greek KKE). Reformist 
communists retain some elements of communism but “have discarded aspects of the Soviet 
model” and embraced some of the new politics agenda (e.g. the Italian Communist 
Refoundation – Rifondazione Comunista, RC). Democratic socialists are the subgroup that 
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comprises most of successful European RLPs (e.g. the Greek SYRIZA, the Icelandic VG, 
the Portuguese BE); these parties “define themselves both in opposition to ‘totalitarian’ 
communism and ‘neo-liberal’ social-democracy” and combine “old left” socioeconomic 
issues with “new left” post-materialist concerns. Populist socialists share the “ideological 
core” of democratic socialists but “with a stronger anti-elite, anti-establishment appeal” 
(e.g. the German Die Linke); this discourse is also developed by Social populist parties, 
which have an “essentially incoherent ideology, fusing left-wing and right-wing themes 
behind an anti-establishment appeal” (March, 2011, pp. 18–19). March (2011) also 
subsequently places RLPs in an additional two-category classification based on “degree of 
radicalism or extremism”: the radical left parties with an anti-capitalist critique of the 
Washington consensus and aiming for political system reform though accepting some 
aspects of liberal democracy and a “mixed market economy”; and the extreme left parties 
with a more self-styled “revolutionary” attitude, demonstrating far greater hostility towards 
liberal democracy, market economy and capitalism (pp. 16–18). 
Keith & March (2016) recently review these classifications and exclude two of 
March’s previously developed subgroups (populist socialists and social populists) due to 
the growing academic understanding of populism4 as a neutral political ideology, adding a 
new one: the revolutionary extreme Left (p. 9). This adaptation of March’s typology seems 
to be a reasonable one and has our agreement since – as referred by these authors – “so 
many RLPs now use populist anti-establishment appeals that having populism as a separate 
category seems otiose” (p. 12). 
These classifications and subgroups are useful to understand some of the most 
important divisions among RLPs but they should not be seen as strict and immutable 
categories. In fact, some RLPs share elements of more than one subgroup and “move 
between categories over time” (Keith & March, 2016, p. 9). Furthermore, differences 
between RLPs are frequently revealed not in terms of their “ideological affinities”, but 
rather in their attitude towards specific policy issues (Keith & March, 2016, p. 9). Gomez 
et al. (2016) therefore proposes a different classification based on RLPs attention to 
socioeconomic and new politics (non-socioeconomic) issues, with the New Left RLPs 
adopting a “New Politics/New Left discourse” that mixes the radical left’s traditional 
																																																						
4 For a definition of populism, see Mudde (2004, p. 543). 
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economic themes with more post-materialist concerns, and Traditional RLPs that 
essentially keep the “classical radical left discourse” based on materialism and class. 
 These two classifications – March (2011) and Gomez et al. (2016) – overlap to a 
large extent since Traditional RLPs essentially correspond to the conservative communist 
subgroup of March’s classification, plus the Danish EL and the Cypriot AKEL 
(Progressive Party of Working People, Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú), while 
most of the remaining RLPs are classified as New Left RLPs. However, we prefer to use 
March’s (2011) typology as it focuses on “long-term identity” rather than more contextual 
characteristics like policy preferences. Regardless of this choice, our study uses the broad 
concept of radical left parties (RLPs), ranging from the proto-Stalinist Greek Communist 
Party (KKE) to the quasi-social democratic Icelandic Left-Green Movement (VG), 
although sometimes we refer to the conservative communists as a distinct subtype among 
SRLPs due to their particular positions on some ideological dimensions. 
 
Gaps in the literature 
 Despite receiving fresh academic attention, there are still some important gaps in 
the literature on RLPs’ diversity. Although several ideological or policy-based 
classifications have been recently developed (e.g. Backes & Moreau, 2008; Gomez et al., 
2016; Keith & March, 2016; March, 2011), the study of the “ideological differences 
among RLPs” remains a largely unexplored field of study (Gomez et al., 2016, p. 369). 
 Although March (2011) classifies RLPs according to their “ideological affinities” 
and “degree of radicalism or extremism”, the extent to which those categories correspond 
to different positions in the main ideological dimensions of the European political space 
(i.e. economic left-right, new politics (GAL-TAN), European integration – Bakker, Jolly, 
& Polk, 2012) remains to be empirically addressed. One may wonder if the Italian RC and 
the Cypriot AKEL – both categorized by March as reformist communists – take similar 
positions in the new politics dimension, as some studies classify them distinctly as 
Traditional and New Left RLPs, respectively (Gomez et al., 2016). The way these 
categories and subgroups of RLPs relate to different positions over specific policy issues 
and ideological dimensions is a line of research that could be further expanded. 
Other authors note that despite the significant overlap of existing classifications, 
future research should focus on “the evolution of RLPs over time in their ideological and 
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policy positions” and the “incorporation of New Politics issues within and across parties” 
(Gomez et al., 2016, p. 369). In fact, longitudinal studies could be helpful to analyze the 
evolution of RLPs’ ideological and policy positions over the years, as well as the impact of 
specific political events. Fagerholm (2016) partially addresses this issue and demonstrates 
how European RLPs de-radicalized since the fall of the Berlin Wall and now give greater 
emphasis to post-materialist issues – particularly Nordic RLPs. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the only systematic study of this kind about the radical left party family. 
Other important avenues of research that can be further developed are the study of 
alternative “underlying” ideological dimensions such as the “different degrees of populism 
(that) can be found among RLPs” (Gomez et al., 2016, p. 370). 
The ideological diversity of RLPs can also be observed throughout different 
European regions. For example, Eastern European RLPs – with their “state-socialist 
legacy” – are significantly different in terms of ideology from those in Western Europe 
(March, 2011, p. 8). These regional differences are often recognized by the literature and, 
sometimes, some of these RLPs are even grouped together suggesting the possibility of 
well-defined region-based ideological subgroups (e.g. the Nordic Green Left). However, 
few studies have directly compared the ideological positions of RLPs “across countries and 
regions” (March, 2011, p. 7) and – as noted above – most studies have been “single 
country studies or limited cross-country comparisons”. Therefore, there is still a lack of 
empirical knowledge on these differences and the existence of such region-based 
subgroups is yet to be demonstrated. 
Thus, the comparative study of the ideological differences among RLPs – 
particularly across countries and regions – is still an important lacuna in the radical left’s 
literature. As Keith & March (2016, p. 2) argue, “vital work could be done simply by 
updating, broadening and deepening the existing empirical base and in analyzing and 
critiquing the categorizations and hypotheses already advanced”. We follow on their 
suggestion and therefore attempt to extend this knowledge by comparatively studying the 
ideological differences between the RLPs from two European regions: Nordic and 
Southern European countries. 
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2.3. Nordic and Southern European RLPs 
 
 The literature acknowledges significant differences and affinities between the RLPs 
from two of the regions where they have been most successful, Nordic and Southern 
European countries; whether in terms of ideology (Fagerholm, 2016; Gomez et al., 2016; 
March, 2011), participation in government (Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Dunphy & Bale, 2011) 
or even international cooperation (Dunphy & March, 2013). The Nordic and the Southern 
European RLPs are often grouped and analyzed together as the subject of several political 
science studies (e.g. Charalambous & Lamprianou, 2016; Eskelinen, 2015; Tsakatika & 
Lisi, 2013), suggesting the possibility of two distinct and well-defined region-based 
subgroups of RLPs. The comparative study of their ideological differences can thus 
contribute to better understand the ideological diversity of the European radical left. 
 
Nordic and Southern European countries 
 Nordic and Southern European countries provide an interesting political context for 
the comparative study of RLPs ideological differences. Nordic countries are often grouped 
together as they share identical political systems, geographical and linguistic affinities 
(Arter, 2016; Johansson & Raunio, 2001, p. 231; Lane & Ersson, 2008), but the same also 
happens with the countries from Southern Europe (Charalambous & Lamprianou, 2016; 
Colomer, 2008; Pasquino, 2008; Tsakatika & Lisi, 2013). Nordic countries are known for 
their strong welfare state, public services and low income inequalities (Eskelinen, 2015, p. 
115; Lane & Ersson, 2008) and it is easy to find them topping successive Human 
Development Indexes. On the contrary, nowhere has the 2008 economic crisis been as 
profound as in Southern European countries like Greece, Cyprus, Portugal or Spain 
(Tsakatika & Lisi, 2013, p. 5). Having a weaker welfare state tradition, these countries 
have some of the lowest wages and highest unemployment levels of the European Union5. 
But despite these differences, the two regions share the fact that they have provided 
consistent levels of electoral support to RLPs like few other European regions in the last 
three decades (Keith & March, 2016, p. 30). 
 
																																																						
5 In 2013, unemployment levels went up to 27.5% in Greece, 26.1% in Spain and 16.4% in Portugal 
(Eurostat). 
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Nordic radical left parties (NRLPs) 
 Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – are an 
interesting case study for RLPs due to their strong social democratic and “welfare state 
tradition” (Eskelinen, 2015, p. 115). In fact, economic liberalization at the hands of 
successive right-wing governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s has led to an increase 
in inequalities and was perceived as an attack on the nordic model (Eskelinen, 2015, pp. 
115–116; March, 2011, pp. 95–96). Another reason is the fact that the support for far-right 
populist parties has increased in almost every Nordic country6 while, at the same time and 
with a few exceptions (Iceland and Denmark), there has been a retreat in the electoral 
support for RLPs (Eskelinen, 2015, p. 118). This suggests that, unlike other European 
countries (notably in the South), it was the far-right – not the radical left – who capitalized 
on the dissatisfaction with welfare state reduction policies and the global economic crisis. 
 Nordic radical left parties – the Nordic Green Left – are often described as being 
more “pragmatic” (March, 2011, pp. 95–96), de-radicalized and oriented towards post-
materialist issues (Eskelinen, 2015; Fagerholm, 2016) than their counterparts from the 
South (Eskelinen, 2015, p. 117). Their willingness to participate in power has led them to 
experience government participation either by integrating cabinets (Iceland, Norway and 
Finland) or by being part of parliamentary coalitions of support to governments (Denmark 
and Sweden) (Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Dunphy & Bale, 2011; March, 2011, p. 96). Nordic 
RLPs are known for a more institutional and reformist approach to political intervention 
that contrasts with the more “street-protest-oriented” attitude of Southern European RLPs 
(Eskelinen, 2015, p. 117). However, European integration is a considerable anathema for 
the Nordic Green Left, as these parties share an identity of “Nordic exceptionalism” and 
strong Euroscepticism that distinguishes them from some other more pro-european RLPs, 
like the Greek SYRIZA, the Spanish IU (Izquierda Unida, United Left) or the Cypriot 
AKEL (Charalambous, 2011; Eskelinen, 2015, p. 120; March, 2011, pp. 95–97). 
 
Southern European radical left parties (SRLPs) 
 Southern European RLPs, on the other hand, are often seen as mere “protest 
parties” (Eskelinen, 2015, p. 117; Tsakatika & Lisi, 2013, p. 8). AKEL’s long-time 
																																																						
6 In recent polls (December 2016), far-right parties were up to 24% in Sweden, 17% in Denmark and 10% in 
Finland. 
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dominance of the Cypriot left and the participation of the Italian Communist Refoundation 
(RC) in the government led by Romano Prodi, were nothing but a rarity in the recent 
history of the Southern European radical left (Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Dunphy & Bale, 
2007). The strength of SRLPs has been their ability to capitalize on political dissatisfaction 
(Ramiro, 2016, p. 7) and their ties with trade unions and social movements (Tsakatika & 
Lisi, 2013). Terms such as “radical” or “populist” are often used to describe these parties 
(Mudde, 2017; Ramiro & Gomez, 2016; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014), that seem to 
be more oriented towards the traditional socioeconomic issues of the “old” left than their 
counterparts from the North (Fagerholm, 2016). 
 Following the Great Recession, and as harsh austerity measures were being 
imposed upon countries in financial difficulties, the perceptions about RLPs slowly started 
to change. In a context of strong electoral dissatisfaction with traditional parties, SRLPs 
assumed a new and unexpected protagonism and electoral success in some countries: 
SYRIZA won the two Greek legislative elections of 2015 and now leads a coalition 
government with a nationalist and Eurosceptic right-wing party; in Spain, the newly-born 
Podemos achieved 21% in the 2016 national election and was close to becoming the 
biggest left-wing party in Las Cortes Generales; and in Portugal, the Left Bloc and the 
Communist Party are now supporting a minority executive of the center-left Socialist Party 
(Partido Socialista, PS). These developments confirm what March & Rommerskirchen had 
hinted a few years ago when they suggested the post-crisis political context was ideal for 
the flourishing of RLPs (2015, p. 40). The same context, however, did not provide the 
same electoral success for Nordic RLPs as they were frequently outpaced by the rise of the 
radical right parties that stormed their national party systems. 
 
Addressing the gaps in the literature 
As we have shown, the differences that the literature acknowledges between Nordic 
and Southern European RLPs, suggest that they can be classified into two ideologically 
distinct subgroups of RLPs. However, the extent to which those differences find empirical 
evidence and allow for such a classification, is not yet clear and remains to be addressed. 
Therefore, a comparative study between Nordic and Southern European RLPs can not only 
empirically analyze this suggestion raised by this literature review, but also address what 
we have identified as one of the main gaps in radical left parties’ literature: the lack of 
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comparative study of the ideological differences among RLPs – particularly across 
countries and regions. In addition, a comparative study like this can also expand the 
existing knowledge on RLPs by providing new and up-to-date information on the 
ideological positioning of these parties, including those that had not yet been included in 
previous studies on RLPs (e.g. the Spanish Podemos, the Italian SEL). We thus formulate 
our main research question as follows: are there two different ideological subgroups of 
radical left parties, a Nordic and a Southern European one? 
In order to answer this question, we must first understand how ideological 
differences between political parties can be studied and review some of the most important 
theoretical concepts behind the study of ideology. These are the issues that the next chapter 
discusses, before proceeding with the elaboration of the theoretical hypotheses of our 
dissertation. 
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Chapter 3 
Studying ideological differences between Radical 
Left Parties 
 
 
In order to address our research question, we engage on a direct cross-regional 
comparison of the ideological differences between RLPs from Nordic and Southern 
European countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to perform a 
systematic and comparative examination of the ideological positions of RLPs from two 
different European regions and to evaluate whether a region-based sub-classification of 
RLPs finds empirical support. However, to carry out such an enterprise, it is first necessary 
to review the literature regarding the ideological comparison between political parties. 
In this sense, the present chapter discusses the general theory and main concepts 
behind the study of political parties’ ideology, presents the main dimensions of party 
competition in the European political space and explains how these can be applied to the 
study of the ideological differences between European RLPs. It then proceeds with a 
review on how Nordic and Southern European RLPs are expected to behave in terms of 
three main ideological dimensions of competition – the Economic left-right, the new 
politics/GAL-TAN and the European integration – which eventually leads to the 
development of a series of theoretical hypotheses that will guide our empirical analysis on 
the ideological differences between NRLPs and SRLPs. 
 
 
3.1. The “ideology” in political parties 
 
 The study of parties as “politically purposive” organizations expressing certain 
“ideological values” has been one of the main foci of recent research on political parties 
(Luther & Müller-Rommel, 2002, p. 6). These values are a fundamental part of the identity 
of political parties and determine important features such as their policy proposals, 
relationship with supporters and with each other (Luther & Müller-Rommel, 2002, pp. 5–
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6). The “ideological and identity dimensions” of parties are of central importance in 
representative democracies as they play a relevant role in “anchoring” citizens’ preferences 
and structuring the party systems (Lisi, 2015, p. 123). The study of the ideological features 
of political parties is thus essential to better understand their political identity and ‘who 
they are’. 
 
Dimensions of identification and competition 
 The “long-term identity” of political parties can be captured by the dimensions of 
identification and of competition7 (Lisi, 2015, p. 123). The first one – identification – 
relates to the ideological traits and values shared by identical political parties and is 
traditionally associated to specific spiritual families: the christian democrats, social 
democrats, communists, the greens, etc. (Lisi, 2015, p. 40). These are the “core identities” 
of parties that “provide the principles” serving as “domains of identification” for party 
elites, members and voters (Volkens & Klingemann, 2002, p. 144). The other dimension – 
of competition – is related to the “(ideological) divisions” arising from “the main cleavages 
in society” (Lisi, 2015, p. 123) and structure the lines along which political parties compete 
in the political system (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013, pp. 27–28). These cleavages – grounded 
on Lipset & Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage theory – were initially based largely on religion and 
class but have been progressively replaced by other economic, social and cultural-based 
cleavages (Henjak, 2010). Political parties tend to adopt, emphasize and take different 
positions along the “dimensions of (policy) competition” in order to compete for electoral 
support (Freire, 2015, p. 49). 
 
Analyzing the ideology of political parties 
 Nowadays, ideology is thought to be less relevant for the electorate and for 
distinguishing political parties, calling into question the validity of an ideology-based 
approach for their comparative study (Lisi, 2011, pp. 14–15). But while it might be less 
relevant for the study of party families that are considered to have become more de-
ideologized8, this approach may still be useful for the comparison of (at least) political 
																																																						
7 Concepts developed by Sani & Sartori (1983) 
8 See the theory of the cartel party in Katz & Mair (1995). 
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parties that are considered to be “highly ideological”, like radical left parties (March, 2012, 
p. 331).  
 The dimension of competition seems to be the one that best captures parties’ 
ideological differences. As Freire (2015, p. 49) notes, the dimension of identification is 
relatively stable and “unresponsive” to changes in policy positions on different issues, 
making it less useful for a longitudinal comparison between parties’ ideological 
differences. In addition, an analysis based on RLPs’ dimension of identification (i.e. the 
“traits (...) traditionally associated to specific spiritual families”) has, in our opinion, 
already been reasonably addressed by March (2011). Lisi (2011) states that “using 
empirical data about parties’ positions evolution, it is possible to examine the ‘political 
space’ of party competition and the ideological traits associated to the main parties” (p. 
10). Indeed, the use of empirical methodologies that measure ideological positioning 
allows information on party positions in the main ideological dimensions over time and a 
degree of quantification that goes beyond March’s in-depth qualitative analysis. Following 
this perspective, we engage in the study of RLPs’ ideological differences by focusing on 
the evolution of their positions along the most important “dimensions of (policy) 
competition” (Freire, 2015, p. 49). But first, and in order to perform this, we have to find 
out which of those dimensions are the most relevant for structuring party competition. 
 
Main dimensions of competition in Europe 
 Bakker, Jolly, & Polk (2012) explored dimensionality in the European political 
space and point out the relevance of three “distinct dimensions of political contestation”: 
the traditional economic left-right, social left-right (new politics) and European integration 
dimensions (pp. 220–221, 231). 
The economic left-right is arguably the reference dimension and the most used for 
“summarizing the broad positions of parties and voters” (Dalton & McAllister, 2015, p. 
764). It is based on traditional socioeconomic issues and “concerned” with economic 
distribution, welfare state, market regulation and the role of government in the economy 
(Marks, Hooghe, Nelson, & Edwards, 2006, p. 66). In general, left-wing parties are more 
supportive of government intervention, the promotion of economic equality and advocate 
for a wider welfare state, while right-wing parties tend to defend economic liberalism, less 
state intervention and lower taxes (Lachat, 2017, p. 2). And although the left-right scale 
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“may vary across countries and over time” and is “based on the class cleavage” (Bakker & 
Hobolt, 2013, p. 27), party positions along this dimension help explain a great deal of 
“party competition, coalition-building and policy outcomes” (Jahn, 2011, p. 2). But as the 
traditional left-right cleavage seems to be weakening in terms of its “mobilizational 
capacity” for parties, other dimensions have become increasingly relevant “to mobilize and 
retain supporters” (Luther & Müller-Rommel, 2002, p. 13). 
The new politics dimension – also known as the GAL-TAN 
(Green/Alternative/Libertarian vs Traditionalist/Authoritarian/Nationalist) or the social 
left-right dimension – is one of those dimensions and captures the positioning on non-
economic issues related with new cultural attitudes and post-materialist values (Inglehart, 
1977, 1990; Knutsen, 1988). These are the so called “life style” issues, such as 
environmentalism, feminism, pacifism or minorities’ rights, and became a new source for 
political cleavages as they entered political parties’ agendas during the last decades of the 
twentieth century (Inglehart, 2008; March & Mudde, 2005; Zilliacus, 2001). Parties 
considered to be more libertarian or post-materialist – i.e. closer to the GAL axis – are 
more in favor of pacifism, environmental protection and the expansion of “personal 
freedoms” (e.g. abortion rights, euthanasia, same-sex marriage), while the more traditional 
and authoritarian parties – i.e. closer to the TAN axis – tend to value more “order, 
tradition, and stability” with the government assuming a role of “moral authority” on some 
of these issues (Bakker et al., 2015, p. 144). 
The European integration dimension has also been described as one of the new 
important cleavages for party competition in Europe (Bakker et al., 2012; Hooghe, Marks, 
& Wilson, 2002; Kriesi, 2016; Marks & Wilson, 2000). European integration is here 
understood as the ongoing process of economic and political supranational integration 
between EU member states (Marks & Wilson, 2000, p. 436) and this dimension structures 
party preferences “for more or less European integration” (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013, p. 28). 
The process of European integration is closely related to the concept of Euroscepticism. 
Euroscepticism is conceptualized by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) as consisting on two 
different strands of hard and soft Euroscepticism: hard Euroscepticism defined as a 
“principled opposition to the project of European integration”, while soft Euroscepticism 
does not include a “principled objection” to this process but rather an opposition to its 
current state or trajectory (pp. 247–248). Kopecky & Mudde (2002) propose a different 
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classification and distinguish between two dimensions of “support for European 
integration” (p. 300): one related with a more ‘diffuse’ support for “general ideas of 
European integration” (Europhiles and Europhobes), and the other with the ‘specific’ 
support for the EU “as it is developing” (EU-optimists and EU-pessimists). Following this 
framework of analysis, they develop a four-category classification for political parties’ 
attitudes towards the EU: Euroenthusiasts (Europhile and EU-optimists), Eurosceptics 
(Europhile but EU-pessimists), Eurorejects (Europhobes and EU-pessimists) and 
Europragmatists (Europhobes but EU-optimists). 
The relevance of these dimensions for party competition has been referred and 
addressed by several authors (e.g. Bornschier, 2010; Kriesi, 2016; Proksch & Lo, 2012; 
Rovny & Edwards, 2012) and they are frequently used for the comparative study between 
political parties (see, for example, Burean & Popp, 2015; Carroll & Kubo, 2017; Lisi, 
2015; McElroy & Benoit, 2010; Wagner & Meyer, 2017). In the following section, we 
explain how these dimensions will be used for the ideological comparison between RLPs.  
 
 
3.2. RLPs in the main ideological dimensions of competition 
 
 Significant differences between RLPs are expected to be found along the main 
ideological dimensions of competition. For example, as mentioned in Chapter 2, RLPs 
express different levels of Euroscepticism (Charalambous, 2011; Dunphy & March, 2013) 
attention to post-materialist issues (Fagerholm, 2016; Gomez et al., 2016), and take distinct 
positions in several policy issues related to these dimensions. Although not very extensive, 
the literature on RLPs ideological positions allows us to develop and formulate some 
theoretical hypotheses that may establish the relevant ideological differences between 
Nordic and Southern European RLPs. 
 
Economic left-right dimension 
 Contrary to other party families, no significant variation has been found within left 
party families along the left-right dimension (Volkens & Klingemann, 2002). In fact, there 
is a great knowledge gap on the relative positions of RLPs in this dimension, which 
significantly increases the need to assess this empirically. Moreover, the lack of studies on 
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this subject only makes it more difficult to advance with the formulation of hypotheses on 
the ideological differences between RLPs on the economic left-right. In order to develop 
more educated guesses on these differences, we thus have to look into more subjective 
considerations about these RLPs and their stances on socioeconomic issues. 
 Southern RLPs are often referred in the literature as being more “radical” than 
Nordic RLPs, not only because they have been more averse to compromise and 
participation in government experiences but also because of their less institutional 
approach to politics, often more oriented towards extra-parliamentary activism and street 
protest (Eskelinen, 2015, p. 117; Tsakatika & Lisi, 2013). On the other hand, the Nordic 
Green Left is thought to be more “pragmatic” (March, 2011, p. 95), which can be both due 
to its greater availability for compromise or to less radical stances on socioeconomic 
issues. In addition, it is also known that the Southern European radical left includes two 
conservative communist parties – the Greek KKE and the Portuguese PCP – which usually 
focus more on “core socioeconomic” issues (Gomez et al., 2016; March, 2011) and take 
more radical left-wing positions on this dimension. This suggests that RLPs from Southern 
Europe may be more “radical” and “leftist” than Nordic RLPs. 
 Fagerholm (2016) demonstrates that most European RLPs have been de-
radicalizing and progressively moving towards the center of the left-right scale, since the 
fall of communism (1989-91). He shows that this process is “particularly clear among (...) 
democratic socialist parties in the Nordic countries” (pp. 11–12), but seems to have been 
recently reversed in some of the countries most affected by the 2008 economic crisis and 
austerity policies, i.e. Southern European countries. A “re-radicalization” of SRLPs 
apparently took place in the early 2010s, in contrast with the reported evolution of Nordic 
RLPs along the left-right scale (Fagerholm, 2016). We want to empirically assess these 
perceptions and thus hypothesize that SRLPs not only take more radical positions on 
socioeconomic issues, but that they have also re-radicalized since the Great Recession: 
 
H1a: Southern European RLPs take more leftist positions in the economic left-
right dimension than Nordic RLPs. 
 
H1b: Southern European RLPs have “re-radicalized” in the economic left-
right dimension since the 2008 economic crisis. 
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 An assessment of the ideological differences between RLPs should not be 
exclusively based on the examination of issue positions – i.e. the positions they take on the 
different ideological dimensions. We must also analyze the emphasis given to different 
programmatic issues as done by Gomez et al. (2016) – issue salience –  and how these 
have evolved over time (Fagerholm, 2016), as we consider that ‘ideology’ is a function of 
both issue positions and salience (Rovny, 2012, p. 275). Therefore, we look for empirical 
evidence that establishes a clear distinction between NRLPs and SRLPs in terms of 
salience given to issues related to the main dimensions of party competition. 
The literature on the subject gives consistency to the idea that the great majority of 
RLPs have embraced and now give greater emphasis to post-materialist issues since the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, and particularly in the case of the Nordic Green Left (Fagerholm, 
2016, p. 6). RLPs from Southern Europe, even if some have extensively adopted post-
materialist values in their discourse as well (see, for example, Gomez et al., 2016), seem to 
have recently re-focused on socioeconomic issues due to the economic crisis and the 
impacts of austerity in their countries (Fagerholm, 2016). Plus, following Inglehart’s 
original hypothesis (1977), Nordic societies should be more post-materialist than Southern 
European ones, given their more developed welfare states and higher economic prosperity 
(the scarcity hypothesis). This suggests that SRLPs may now give more emphasis to 
materialist/class issues than NRLPs and we thus hypothesize that issue salience on 
socioeconomic issues is stronger among Southern European RLPs: 
 
H1c: Southern European RLPs give more emphasis to traditional 
socioeconomic issues than Nordic RLPs. 
 
New politics (GAL-TAN) dimension 
 The GAL-TAN dimension seems to be particularly relevant for the study of RLPs, 
as it is reported by some authors as the one that best captures differences among this party 
family (Gomez et al., 2016). As noted above, Nordic RLPs are said to be more focused on 
post-materialist issues and adopting more libertarian positions than Southern European 
RLPs (Fagerholm, 2016; Gomez et al., 2016, p. 361; March, 2011, p. 95), who in turn give 
greater emphasis to traditional socioeconomic/materialist issues (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 18) 
or simply do not go as far as their counterparts from the North in these issues. This seems 
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somewhat consistent with the distinct political and cultural contexts of these two regions: 
Nordic societies are said to be the most post-materialist societies in the world (Inglehart, 
1997, p. 22), while Southern European countries have just recently lived under 
authoritarian regimes for a great part of the last century and are known to be socially more 
conservative in terms of personal freedoms (Colomer, 2008; Lane & Ersson, 2008). This 
may reflect in their RLPs’ ideology and suggests that NRLPs may take more libertarian 
positions on the GAL-TAN dimension and focus more on post-materialist themes. We thus 
hypothesize that NRLPs take positions closer to the GAL axis of this dimension and give 
greater emphasis to non-socioeconomic issues than SRLPs:  
 
H2a: Nordic RLPs take more GAL (green/alternative/libertarian) positions in 
the GAL-TAN dimension than Southern European RLPs. 
 
H2b: Nordic RLPs give greater emphasis to non-socioeconomic issues than 
Southern European RLPs. 
 
European integration dimension 
The radical left is a Eurosceptical party family that strongly criticizes what it 
perceives as the neoliberal nature of the EU (Charalambous, 2011; Hooghe et al., 2002; 
March, 2011). And even if there is a growing debate about the relevance of the European 
integration dimension for distinguishing political parties (Proksch & Lo, 2012), the 
literature acknowledges that Euroscepticism and the support towards the process of 
European integration are a great source of diversity among RLPs and their electorate. 
While some of these parties are strong advocates of the withdrawal from the EU, others 
fight for a change from within (Charalambous, 2011; March, 2011; March & 
Rommerskirchen, 2015, p. 43). And, for example, the voters of New Left RLPs seem to be 
less Eurosceptical than those of Traditional RLPs (Gomez et al., 2016, pp. 367–368). 
Charalambous (2011) uses two frameworks – developed by Kopecky & Mudde 
(2002) and Szczerbiak & Taggart (2008) – for the study of party-based Euroscepticism and 
concludes that a more moderate stance on these issues can be detected among different 
subtypes of RLPs. However, no conclusion is made in terms of its geographical 
distribution, opening the space for the empirical study of the differences among Nordic and 
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Southern RLPs in terms of their levels of Euroscepticism and their positions on the 
European Integration dimension. 
 The Euroscepticism and sense of “Nordic exceptionalism” of the Nordic Green Left 
has been described by the literature (Eskelinen, 2015; Johansson & Raunio, 2001; March, 
2011, pp. 95–96), in contrast to the more pro-European stance of some SRLPs 
(Beaudonnet & Gomez, 2017; Charalambous, 2011). But with harsh austerity measures 
being recently imposed by EU institutions on some Southern European countries since 
2010 (Greece, Portugal, Spain), we may expect an increase in their anti-European 
discourse that we do not find in Nordic countries, as they were not as affected by the crisis. 
In addition, Greece and Portugal have two strong orthodox communist parties (KKE and 
PCP), who are hard-Eurosceptics and support an withdrawal from the EU (Charalambous, 
2011). These ideological differences towards European integration and cooperation at the 
international level are also reflected in RLPs’ unequal participation in transnational 
platforms like the Party of the European Left (Charalambous, 2011, p. 299; Dunphy & 
March, 2013): for example, Nordic RLPs are very skeptical of this organization and only 
the Danish EL and the Finnish VAS are members of this European political party (Dunphy 
& March, 2013). Thus, even if it is unclear where all these parties stand at the moment – 
due to the possible impacts of the European crisis – we put forward the hypothesis that 
Nordic RLPs are nevertheless more Eurosceptical than Southern RLPs, with the latter 
having become more Eurosceptical since the 2008 economic crisis. 
 
H3a: Nordic RLPs take stronger Eurosceptical positions in the European 
integration dimension than Southern European RLPs. 
 
H3b: Southern European RLPs have been taking more Eurosceptical positions 
in the European integration dimension since the 2008 economic crisis. 
 
Ideological distances 
 The consequences of the ideological distances between political parties were 
extensively examined by Sartori (1976). This author relates ideological distance with the 
“polarization of the party system” and the dynamics of “inter-party competition” (1976, p. 
44). The existence of radical parties – located in the extremes of the political spectrum – 
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acts as a “centrifugal force” that enlarges ideological distances in the national party 
systems, as opposed to those where their absence makes the existing parties compete for 
“voters in the center of the ideological spectrum” (Volkens & Klingemann, 2002, p. 144). 
Radicalism is a frequently used term in the studies on RLPs. Not only it is included 
in their name – the radical left parties – but it is also used for their adjectivation. But RLPs 
seem to have de-radicalized and abandoned much of their radicalism since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall (Fagerholm, 2016; March, 2011). March (2011, p. 10) argues that the 
radicalism of the radical left is mostly “situational” and based on “articulating issues 
radical in the party’s national context”. This suggests that RLPs’ radicalism can be better 
understood by analyzing the relative distance of its positions from the political center (i.e. 
from status-quo parties’ positions) rather than the specific positions they hold on certain 
issues. For instance, advocating for abortion rights can be seen as something “radical” in a 
conservative country like Poland, but not in the Nordic countries. Or, the defense of same-
sex marriage was seen as something “radical” in the late 1990s in Portugal, but certainly 
not in 2017. Therefore, we seek to explore and analyze the ideological distances between 
RLPs and their main center-left competitors in order to explore differences in radicalism 
between Nordic and Southern RLPs as perceived in their own national party systems.  
The ideological distances between RLPs and SDs may explain important features of 
their party systems such as government participation and coalition potential (March & 
Freire, 2012, p. 219; Olsen et al., 2010). As Nordic RLPs are thought to be more pragmatic 
and de-radicalized (see H1a and H1b) than Southern European RLPs, we expect them to 
be ideologically closer to their social democratic competitors. And, in fact, RLPs 
participation in government has been more frequent in Nordic countries than in Southern 
Europe except for the last few years (Bale & Dunphy, 2011; Dunphy & Bale, 2011). Of 
course one could argue that a shorter ideological distance between these parties can be due 
to the center-left party being more radicalized and not because the RLP is more moderate. 
But what we here want to address is not RLPs’ radicalism per se or how radical their 
positions are on the economic left-right dimension – which is already addressed by H1a – 
but rather their ideological distance to social democratic parties as a measure (a ‘proxy’) of 
a perceived “radicalism” in their own national context. We thus expect Nordic RLPs 
allegedly more “centrist” positions and availability for government participation to make 
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them closer to social democratic parties in the economic left-right dimension – the main 
dimension of party competition: 
 
H4: Nordic RLPs are ideologically closer to the major social democratic party 
of their countries in the economic left-right dimension than Southern European 
RLPs. 
 
Conclusion to the chapter 
 The present chapter started by reviewing the theoretical framework that structures 
our study of political parties’ ideology and ended up identifying some of the main 
ideological differences we expect to find between Nordic and Southern European RLPs. 
This led to the development of seven theoretical hypotheses related both with the 
positioning of RLPs in the main ideological dimensions of party competition and with 
salience given to economic and non-socioeconomic issues. To these more intuitive 
hypotheses, we add an additional one based on the ideological distances to social 
democratic parties as a ‘proxy’ for the study of RLP’s “situational” radicalism in their own 
national contexts. When tested, these hypotheses are expected to allow us to analyze to 
what extent those ideological differences find empirical support in the data and can give an 
answer to our research question. The following chapter describes and critically discusses 
the methodological framework and empirical methods that will be used for the 
operationalization and testing of these hypotheses. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodological approach 
 
 
 At the heart of this work is a longitudinal examination and comparison of RLPs’ 
positions along the three most relevant ideological dimensions for party competition in 
European countries: the economic left-right, the new politics and the European integration 
dimensions (Bakker et al., 2012). This methodological chapter begins by presenting the 
period of analysis and the criteria used for the selection of countries and parties that are 
included in this study. It then provides a critical discussion on the empirical methods used 
for measuring party positions, presenting the main advantages and disadvantages of the 
two datasets (CMP and CHES) that are used in our analysis. 
This chapter also explains how the ideological scales will be constructed from the 
CMP and CHES datasets in order to measure and compare between party positions, as well 
as how the additional analysis on issue salience and ideological distances will be 
performed to complement the comparative study of the ideological differences between 
Nordic and Southern European RLPs. Finally, the chapter concludes with the presentation 
of the criteria for the confirmation of our theoretical hypotheses. 
 
 
4.1. Period of analysis & case selection 
 
 Our study focuses on the radical left parties from Nordic and Southern European 
countries. Still, we must acknowledge and clarify the timeframe of our study and the 
criteria used for the selection of countries and parties that are included in our analysis. 
 
Period of analysis 
The timeframe of our study is the period between 1989 and 2017. Our analysis 
starts from the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) due to the fact that this event is regarded as a 
paradigm shift in RLPs’ identity and has operated major ideological transformations on 
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these parties (March & Mudde, 2005). The collapse of communism is said to have 
significantly changed RLPs’ “left-right policy positions and their preferred policy issues” 
(Fagerholm, 2016, p. 4). This period of almost three decades also includes another major 
event for RLPs – the Great Recession (2008-2012) – and is large enough to capture the 
evolution of their ideological stances.  
 
Selection of countries 
 ‘Nordic’ countries are here considered to be the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden) plus Finland and Iceland, as the literature often refers “strong links 
with each other”, both “economically and politically” (Lane & Ersson, 2008, p. 246). 
‘Southern European’ countries include the Mediterranean countries that are usually 
referred in the study of RLPs – Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus (Charalambous 
& Lamprianou, 2016; Tsakatika & Lisi, 2013) – and have been the most affected countries 
by the 2008 economic crisis. All Southern European countries had economic bailouts with 
the exception of Italy, despite having also received considerable support from the ECB and 
the EU, in exchange for commitments to reduce its debt and deficit. Although Malta is also 
a Mediterranean country and an EU member-state, it has no relevant radical left party; and 
France, even if sometimes is considered to be ‘Southern’ (e.g. Hobolt & De Vries, 2016; 
Jalali, 2007), it is usually excluded in the existing studies on Southern European countries 
(viz. Lisi, 2010; Lobo & Lewis-Beck, 2012; Verney, 2011). 
 
Selection of parties 
 The selection of parties is made according to their relevance in the respective 
countries. This can be done as in Fagerholm (2016, p. 7), where the author selects RLPs 
with “governmental relevance in the coalition-forming arena” or “with blackmail 
potential”, namely those with representation in the national parliaments; or as in March & 
Freire (2012), where only RLPs that had “moderate” (between 3% to 10%) to “good 
success” (more than 10%) were selected to be studied. We opt to use March & Freire’s 
criterion: RLPs are included in our analysis if they have had more than 3% in at least one 
national election since 1989. This decision allows us not to exclude RLPs that are currently 
not present in national legislatures but are still relevant within this party family (e.g. the 
Italian Communist Refoundation, RC). 
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Table 1. Radical Left Parties (RLPs) included in the study. 
 
Country Parties 
Cyprus AKEL - Progressive Party of Working People (Anorthotikó Kómma 
Ergazómenou Laoú) 
Denmark EL - Unity List – Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne) 
 SF - Socialist People's Party (Socialistik Folkeparti) 
Finland VAS - Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto) 
Greece KKE - Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas) 
 SYRIZA - Coalition of the Radical Left (Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás)a 
Iceland VG - Left Green Movement (Vinstrihreyfingin-grænt framboð)b 
Italy RC - Communist Refoundation (Partito della Rifondazione Comunista) 
 SEL -  Left Ecology Freedom (Sinistra Ecologia Libertà) (2009-2016)c 
Norway SV - Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) 
Portugal PCP - Communist Party of Portugal (Partido Comunista Português)d 
 BE - Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda)e 
Spain IU - United Left (Izquierda Unida)f 
 Podemos - We Can (founded in 2014) 
Sweden 
 
V - Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) 
 
Source: parties-and-elections.eu (data retrieved in 12 September 2017). 
a as Synaspismós (SYN – Progressive Left Coalition) until 2004; b as People’s Alliance (AB) until 1995; c 
dissolved into the Italian Left (SI – Sinistra Italiana) in 2016; d as the electoral coalition CDU (Unitary 
Democratic Coalition) with PEV (Ecologist Party “The Greens”); e founded in 1999 as a merger between 
the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR) and People’s Democratic Union (UDP); f a political coalition 
whose largest member is the Communist Party of Spain (PCE). 
 
 With this criterion, our study includes a total of 15 RLPs from 10 different 
countries (Table 1), which is a quite good number of parties for a cross-regional 
comparison: we get six RLPs from Nordic countries and nine RLPs from Southern 
European countries. In Nordic countries, we have the so-called “Nordic Green Left”, 
which includes the Swedish Left Party (V), the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (SV), the 
Finnish Left Alliance (VAS), the Danish Socialist People’s Party (SF)9 and Red-Green 
Alliance (EL), and the Icelandic Left-Green Movement (VG). In Southern European 
countries, the RLPs that are included are the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and SYRIZA 
(Coalition of the Radical Left), the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and Left Bloc 
(BE), the Spanish Podemos and United Left (IU)10, the Italian Communist Refoundation 
(RC) and Left Ecology Freedom (SEL), and the Cypriot Progressive Party of the Working 
People (AKEL). 
																																																						
9 The Danish SF is considered to be a RLP until 2014, when it joined the European Green Party (Keith & 
March, 2016, p. 5). 
10 In the 2016 Spanish legislative elections, Podemos and IU ran together as the electoral coalition Unidos 
Podemos (United We Can). 
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4.2. Measurements 
 
 To test our hypotheses, we measure and compare the ideological positions of RLPs 
in three ideological dimensions of party competition – economic left-right, GAL-TAN and 
European integration – over a 29-year period. In this section, we address the empirical 
methods that are most frequently used for measuring party positions, issue salience and 
ideological distances, and how we apply them for our study on NRLPs and SRLPs. 
 
Methods for measuring party positions 
 The measurement of the ideological positions of political parties can be done using 
a variety of techniques. Manifesto content analysis, expert, voter and elite/representative 
surveys, or legislators’ voting behavior analysis, are some of the sources of data that are 
available for estimating party positions in the political space (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013; 
Laver, 2014): 
 
a) Party manifestos: content analysis of party manifestos is arguably the most used 
technique for measuring and estimating party positions over time (Bakker & Hobolt, 
2013, p. 28; Lima & Silva, 2015, p. 51). Electoral manifestos are considered to be a 
good summary of ‘who parties are’, as they reflect the “issues and policy positions 
that parties want to strategically emphasize” at a specific point in time (Gomez et al., 
2016, p. 356). The main source of party manifesto data is provided by the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), which is based on the manual coding of 
‘quasi-phrases’ units according to 56 issue-categories, measuring party positions on 
different issues and policy dimensions (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & 
Tanenbaum, 2001; Klingemann, Volkens, & Bara, 2006; Volkens, Bara, Budge, 
McDonald, & Klingemann, 2013). The CMP has the advantage of covering a long 
period of time that spans since World War II, and has been extensively used in 
similar works that map and compare political parties’ positions (Fagerholm, 2016; 
Gomez et al., 2016; March & Freire, 2012; Volkens et al., 2013; Wagner & Meyer, 
2017). The advantages and shortcomings of this dataset are discussed in more detail 
below. 
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b) Expert surveys: in these type of surveys, the placement of political parties is done 
by national experts. Several “cross-national expert surveys” that position parties 
along different ideological scales have been developed (e.g. Bakker et al., 2015; 
Benoit & Laver, 2006; Ray, 1999). Sometimes, the judgment made by experts is 
better in capturing issues that are part of parties’ public discourse and actions, but 
might not be reflected in their manifestos. In addition, these measurements can be 
made in any point in time and not only during election-years, as is the case with the 
comparative manifesto data (Gomez et al., 2016, p. 369; Lima & Silva, 2015, pp. 50–
51). 
 
c) Voter surveys: data from mass surveys of voters can be used for measuring both 
party and voter positions. These surveys estimate positions on the left-right scale 
according to the perceptions of voters and have shown to be “congruent” with the 
placements provided by experts (Lima & Silva, 2015, p. 51).	However, voter surveys 
present several disadvantages that they share with other survey data, namely the 
subjective assessment, excessive stability in party positioning and asymmetric 
information on political parties (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013, pp. 36–37). 
 
d) Elite surveys: these surveys ask political representatives (especially MPs or 
candidates) on how they position themselves and their parties in relation to the 
different policy issues and ideological dimensions. This provides information 
directly from the political elites, instead of making an indirect assessment based on 
voter or experts’ perceptions, which can be ideologically biased (Carroll & Kubo, 
2017; Krouwel & van Elfrinkhof, 2014, pp. 1460–1461). On the other hand, elite 
surveys provide lower response rates and suffer from the permanent “suspicion” that 
politicians may be answering strategically and based on self-interest, thus biasing the 
results (Krouwel & van Elfrinkhof, 2014, pp. 1460–1461; Laver, 2014, pp. 213–
214). 
 
e) Legislators’ voting behavior: this technique determines party positions based on the 
MPs’ voting behavior records in parliaments. Although it allows the collection of 
large amounts of information on representatives’ positions on several issues, it 
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presents serious problems of cross-national comparability and it is mostly used in the 
study of US representatives (Krouwel & van Elfrinkhof, 2014, pp. 1461–1462; 
Laver, 2014, pp. 218–219). 
 
Bakker and Hobolt (2013) review some of these methods in order to get “valid and 
reliable measures of party positions” and concluded that party manifestos, expert and 
voters surveys, result in “very similar” measures of party positions, even if “these datasets 
are constructed very differently” (p. 44).	And despite the disadvantages and limitations of 
each of these methods, the use of more than one of these datasets in our measurements 
allows a cross-validation of the results and is expected to help us overcome some of its 
limitations, as has been suggested (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013; Krouwel & van Elfrinkhof, 
2014) and done by some authors (e.g. Gomez et al., 2016; Marks et al., 2007; Polk et al., 
2017). Therefore, we will use two of the most commonly employed empirical methods for 
measuring and comparing party positions across countries: the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (CMP) Dataset and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). These sources are used 
to construct the policy scales that we use for the comparison of RLPs positions on the three 
ideological dimensions of party competition. We leave aside voter survey data because 
much of this data is dispersed in several sources and its inclusion in our analysis would 
greatly increase the size of this dissertation.  
The Comparative Manifesto Project dataset (https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu) 
(Volkens et al., 2017) is probably the most used source for measuring party positions and it 
is the only one that entirely covers all the timeframe of our study (see Table 2 below). 
Besides having the longest time-series on party positions, this dataset has several other 
important advantages such as its objectivity in estimating positions (as it is based on party 
official manifestos) or its high validity, having been extensively used in several studies 
(Bakker & Hobolt, 2013, pp. 30–32; Benoit & Laver, 2007). But important methodological 
critiques have also been made on the use of this dataset and how it analyses manifestos, 
and we have to consider some of its shortcomings (see, for example, Benoit, Laver, & 
Mikhaylov, 2007; Ejnar Hansen, 2008; Gemenis, 2013). The fact that it provides no 
measures of uncertainty, the high volatility of party positions provided (Bakker & Hobolt, 
2013, pp. 30–32), or the lack of reliability and possibility of coding errors due to some 
manifestos being coded by only one coder (Krouwel & van Elfrinkhof, 2014, pp. 1462–
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1464), are just some of the main criticisms directed at this dataset. As mentioned above, 
we attempt to overcome these disadvantages and ensure the consistency of our results by 
cross-validating our results across the two datasets. 
 
Table 2. Datasets time series and country coverage. 
 
	
Comparative Manifesto Project 
(1945-2017) 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(1999-2014a) 
Country coverage  coverage 
Cyprus since 1996 since 2014 
Denmark R R 
Finland R R 
Greece R R 
Iceland R not included 
Italy R R 
Norway R since 2010 
Portugal R R 
Spain R R 
Sweden 
 
R 
 
R 
 
a The CHES can be merged with the Ray-Marks-Steenbergen dataset (Ray, 1999; Steenbergen 
& Marks, 2007) which provides data on European integration positions since 1984. 
 
The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (https://www.chesdata.eu) is the source of 
expert survey data we use in our measurements as it provides the “longest time series of 
party positions” for this type of surveys (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013, p. 35), starting from the 
1999 to the 2014 survey wave, and has been extensively used for the examination of party 
positions on several policy issues (e.g. Adams et al., 2012; Gomez et al., 2016; Hobolt & 
Tilley, 2016; Meijers, 2015; Rovny, 2013). Although it does not entirely covers the period 
of analysis of our study (see Table 2), the use of the 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
trend file (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017) can be combined with the Ray-Marks-
Steenbergen dataset (Ray, 1999; Steenbergen & Marks, 2007) that merges the CHES with 
Ray’s (1999) dataset to obtain information on European integration since 1989 to 1999 (i.e. 
for the 1992 and 1996 European elections). Expert survey data provides “high face validity 
and internal consistency among experts” as these rate the positions of parties	based on a 
large number of sources of information (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013, p. 35). On the other hand, 
the use of expert surveys also presents several shortcomings: no expert-based dataset 
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covers the period of time that the CMP does, expert’s assessment is rather subjective and 
tends to “exaggerate the stability of party positions” over time (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013, p. 
36). These two sources of data – CMP and CHES – are used to construct the policy scales 
for the comparison of RLPs positions on the three ideological dimensions of party 
competition.  
When looking at Table 2, it is also important to note that the two datasets do not 
provide information about some countries for the entire period under review. This is the 
case of Norway and Cyprus – that have only recently been included in the CHES survey 
waves – and Iceland, which has not even been included in this database yet. In addition, 
there are cases of RLPs – such as the Portuguese BE, the Spanish Podemos or the Italian 
SEL – that have only recently emerged and whose positions will only “count” for the 
overall positioning of the Southern European radical left for the latest periods of time. 
However, despite this limitation, we decided to include all these cases in our measurements 
even though this may have an influence in our results, since we consider that a party family 
is by nature dynamic and its ideological positioning is also subject to this type of changes. 
 
Issue positions (and constructing our ideological scales) 
 The economic left-right and GAL-TAN dimensions allow us to position and 
compare RLPs on socioeconomic (H1a) and liberal-authoritarian (non-socioeconomic) 
issues (H2a). In terms of the CMP data, our main challenge is to select the most adequate 
scales from the several that have already been developed. One of the most popular is the 
general right-left scale (RILE) developed by the Comparative Manifesto team, which is a 
“standard measure” that aspires to position parties according to an “holistic analysis” of 
their manifestos (Budge, 2013, p. 2). But this scale has been severely criticized over the 
years, either in terms of its validity (Bakker & Hobolt, 2013, p. 32; Lowe, Benoit, 
Mikhaylov, & Laver, 2011), its “comprehensiveness” (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 6) or even 
because it is used as a kind of “superdimension”, implying a certain understanding of the 
“unidimensionality” of politics (Prosser, 2014, p. 89). 
Budge (2013) defends the use of RILE on the basis that it is “the best summary 
indicator of policy tendencies over the whole of the party programme” (p. 1) and that it 
correlates with most of the proposed alternative scales. However, we conceptualized our 
left-right dimension as an exclusively economic dimension, and although RILE is mainly 
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based on economic issues, it also includes some non-socioeconomic CMP categories (e.g. 
law and order, traditional morality, or peace) which confuses what we want to measure in 
our ideological dimensions: economic and non-socioeconomic positions, separately. 
Therefore, we must seek to find a more adequate scale to operationalize our hypotheses 
based on the economic left-right dimension, in order to better capture the positions of 
RLPs in socioeconomic issues. The same challenge applies in the case of the GAL-TAN 
dimension, since the CMP dataset does not provide a policy scale solely based on liberal-
authoritarian issues. 
Thus, and according to the above mentioned reasons, we will use the economic left-
right and social liberal conservative (GAL-TAN) scales developed by Prosser (2014). 
Prosser’s version of the economic left-right scale uses some of the same CMP categories 
also used by RILE but is more focused on economic issues, exactly as we need for our 
analysis (Table 3). It is based on 14 categories that emphasize economic issues such as 
“free enterprise”, “market regulation” and “social justice”, while its version of the liberal-
conservative (GAL-TAN) scale uses further 19 categories that include “political 
authority”, “environmental protection” or “multiculturalism”. Evans & Tilley (2017) argue 
that “Prosser’s coding is preferred to RILE, not just on the basis of face validity but 
because Prosser’s scales make fewer assumptions about what categories ‘should’ go on the 
left or the right”; in addition, they are more reliable scales than RILE (p. 140). 
Party positions in Prosser’s scales are calculated differently from the traditional 
CMP scales based on the simple sums and subtractions of the sentences related to each 
policy category (right, left, conservative, liberal). The scales developed by Prosser are 
constructed using the logit scaling method proposed by Lowe et al. (2011): 
 
“where R is the total number of quasi-sentences in the manifesto components on the ‘right’ 
of the scale and L is the total number of quasi-sentences in the manifesto components on 
the ‘left’” (Prosser, 2014, p. 92). According to Evans & Tilley (2017, p. 140), this formula 
“combines the advantages of both additive and ratio-scaling methods for manifesto data, 
while avoiding the problem of polarization found in ratio scales” and diminishes the 
“impact of repeated emphasis” on certain issues. The results of these scales range between 
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-7 and +7 (a 15-point scale) but we harmonize them with the 11-point scales (from 0 to 10) 
of the CHES dataset, otherwise we would be looking at changes in very different scales, 
potentially biasing our reading of the results. 
 
Table 3. Prosser’s (2014) modified CMP dimensional scales.  
 
A. Economic left-right dimension   
Right 
 
Left 
Free Enterprise: Positive (401) Market Regulation: Positive (403) 
Protectionism: Negative (407) Technology and Infrastructure (411) 
Economic Orthodoxy: Positive (414) Controlled Economy: Positive (412) 
Welfare State Limitation: Positive (505) Nationalisation: Positive (413) 
Education Limitation: Positive (507) Social Justice (503) 
Labour Groups: Negative (702) Welfare State Expansion: Positive (504) 
 
Education Expansion: Positive (506) 
  Labour Groups: Positive (701) 
  B. GAL-TAN dimension   
Conservative 
 
Liberal 
Internationalism: Negative (109) Military: Negative (105) 
Centralisation (302) Peace (106) 
Political Authority: Positive (305) Internationalism: Positive (107) 
National Way of Life: Positive (601) Freedom and Human Rights (201) 
Multiculturalism: Negative (608) Democracy (202) 
 
Decentralisation (301) 
 
Anti-Growth Economy (416) 
 
Environmental Protection (501) 
 
Culture (502) 
 
National Way of Life: Negative (602) 
 
Multiculturalism: Positive (607) 
 
Middle Class and Professional Groups (704) 
 
Underprivileged Minority Groups (705) 
  Non-economic Demographic Groups (706) 
   
In terms of expert survey data, we extract expert placements of parties on the 
economic left-right and GAL-TAN dimensions from the 1999-2014 CHES dataset (Bakker 
et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017). The CHES economic left-right scale classifies parties 
according to their stances on “economic issues” such as the role of government in the 
economy and the size of the welfare state, while the GAL-TAN is related with party 
positions on “democratic freedoms and rights” and the expansion “of personal freedoms”, 
in opposition to values of “order” and “moral authority” of the government (Bakker et al., 
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2015, p. 144). Both of these classifications use an 11-point scale that ranges from 0 (more 
leftist/libertarian) to 10 (more rightist/traditional-authoritarian). 
The third scale – European integration – is used to test whether one subgroup of 
RLPs takes more Eurosceptical positions than the other (H3a) and if Southern European 
RLPs have become more Eurosceptical since the 2008 economic crisis (H3b). Marks, 
Hooghe, Steenbergen, and Bakker (2007) cross-validated data of party positions on 
European integration to find that CMP and expert surveys provide “convergent measures” 
on this dimension (p. 33). Expert surveys (CHES) provide “high-quality cross-national 
data” (Hobolt & De Vries, 2015, p. 1169) and despite being considered the “most valid” 
source for studying party positions on the EU dimension, the combined use with additional 
data from manifestos (CMP) “produces more valid measures” than its use alone (Marks et 
al., 2007, pp. 33–34). The data from the CMP is here limited to two categories related with 
the attitudes of parties towards the European integration (Table 4). The positions of RLPs 
in this scale are calculated using the same logit scaling technique (Lowe et al., 2011) used 
in the previous two dimensions and its range is also harmonized with the CHES scale for 
the European Integration (from 1 to 7). 
 
Table 4. CMP categories for the European integration scale. 
 
C. European integration dimension   
Pro-EU 
 
Anti-EU 
European Community/Union: Positive (108) European Community/Union: Negative (110) 
 
 
 In the case of the expert survey data, we merge the 1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey (CHES) trend file with the combined Ray-Marks-Steenbergen dataset (Ray, 1999; 
Steenbergen & Marks, 2007) in order to extend our coverage period to the 1992 and 1996 
survey waves. The combined use of these two datasets is suggested by the CHES team in 
order to provide a larger time series of party positions on the European integration (Bakker 
et al., 2015) and is used by several authors (e.g. Hobolt & De Vries, 2015; Meijers, 2015). 
The CHES asks experts on the “overall orientation of the party leadership towards 
European integration”, with a 7-point scale where 1 means a “strong opposition” and 7 a 
“strong support” for the EU. 
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 After constructing our ideological/policy scales, and before aggregating the results 
of each group of RLPs, we begin by making a descriptive analysis of the disaggregated 
data and of the individual results of each RLPs and their evolution over the years, trying to 
identify evolutionary trends in their positioning. In this phase of our analysis, we also look 
at the consistency and internal coherence of each cluster of parties on the different 
ideological scales. Only then, we proceed with the aggregation of data for both the Nordic 
and Southern European groups of RLPs. 
Then, we average the results for each party for three time points of analysis: 1989-
1998, 1999-2008, and 2009-201711. We use these aggregated time periods for two reasons: 
first, because some literature already uses 10-year periods for the longitudinal study of 
party positions (e.g. Volkens & Klingemann, 2002); second, because these time intervals 
allow us to obtain at least two observations from each party for each time point of analysis. 
Intervals with more than 10 years would be problematic because they would not allow us 
to detect the changes that occurred during the period under review (1989-2017). 
In addition, these three time slots also correspond to historical periods that are 
expected to be very relevant for the European radical left: the 1989-1998 period 
corresponds to the post-fall of the Berlin Wall decade, of which we have already written 
about; the 1999-2008 years have seen the rise of the alterglobal movement, the beginning 
of the single currency and European politicization; and 2009-2017 is essentially the post-
global economic crisis period, whose expected impact on RLPs has been largely discussed. 
Furthermore, there is also the ‘nice’ coincidence that the beginning of the second period of 
analysis (1999-2008) ends up matching the first wave of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. 
The fact that this dataset provides a shorter time-series than the Comparative Manifesto 
dataset, constrains our expert survey measurements for the economic left-right and GAL-
TAN dimensions to the periods of 1999-2008 and 2009-2017. 
 It is also important to clarify how the aggregation of data for each period of time is 
made and how we weigh the positions of each party in those values. It is important to 
avoid countries with more elections counting more in the aggregated results of each group 
of RLPs. We avoid this in the calculation of the average position of each RLP group 
(NRLPs and SRLPs) for each time point of analysis, because we count a single observation 
																																																						
11 Since 29 is a prime number, we can not obtain three equal periods of time. Therefore, the last period has 
only 9 years. 
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by RLP, as we calculate their average position for that period of time. For example, in the 
1989-1998 period Greece had 5 legislative elections, while Finland had only 2. However, 
both the Greek and the Finnish RLPs have the same weight in the aggregated result of their 
respective group of RLPs for the 1989-1998 period, because only their average position for 
the total of these elections is used. Therefore, the aggregated results are not biased towards 
parties that contested more elections on a certain period of time. 
 The comparison between Nordic and Southern RLPs in each ideological dimension 
is then performed by comparing their positions in the three ideological scales – economic 
left-right (H1a), GAL-TAN (H2a) and European integration (H3a) – both by examining 
linear trends in their individual positions and by using statistical tests to compare between 
each groups’ average positions. The statistical test we use to compare the differences 
between the average positions of NRLPs and SRLPs is the independent-means t-test, 
which is used to compare two means obtained from two different populations (Field, 2009, 
p. 325) – in this case, different groups of RLPs. Although the size of our sample may be 
relatively small for the application of a parametric test, our data complies with all the 
assumptions of the independent-means t-test: normal distribution of sampling, 
homogeneity of variance and independent scores (Field, 2009, p. 326). Moreover, since the 
fact that we have a reduced sample size makes it difficult for us to find statistical 
significance between the two groups of RLPs, we have added a p ≤ 0.1 significance level 
to help us detect some degree of statistical significance in our results, albeit smaller. 
 We also evaluate the extent to which RLPs have re-radicalized on the economic 
left-right (H1b) and European integration dimension (H3b) since 2008 by analyzing the 
change on their average positions between the 1999-2008 and 2009-2017 periods. This is 
the method used by Fagerholm (2016) to analyze the de-radicalization of RLPs after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, as he compared their mean values on the left-right dimension for 
the pre- and post-1989 periods. 
 
Issue salience 
 In order to compare the different emphasis given by Nordic and Southern European 
RLPs to socioeconomic (H1c) and non-socioeconomic issues (H2b), we measure issue 
salience with data from both the CMP and CHES datasets, and compare their results. In the 
case of the CHES dataset, we use the results of the questions on the relative salience given 
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by each party leadership to “economic” and “libertarian/authoritarian” issues, in an 11-
point scale where 0 means “no importance” and 10, “great importance” (Bakker et al., 
2015; Polk et al., 2017). These questions, however, have only been asked in the 2014 
CHES survey and therefore our results from expert survey data for RLPs issue salience are 
limited to this year. 
In the case of the Comparative Manifesto dataset (CMP), we follow the methods 
that Rovny (2013) and Wagner & Meyer (2017) use for measuring issue salience. These 
authors calculate issue salience as “the total proportion of statements” on economic and 
non-socioeconomic issues in party manifestos regardless of their direction: left or right, 
libertarian or conservative (Wagner & Meyer, 2017, pp. 90–91). This eventually give us 
the total space (in %) that each RLP dedicates to these issues in their electoral manifestos, 
giving us a value for issue salience that is conceptually different from the positions they 
take on economic (i.e. in the economic left-right dimension) and non-socioeconomic issues 
(i.e. the GAL-TAN dimension) – i.e. issue positions. The difference between our saliency 
measurement and the one of these authors is only that we use the socioeconomic and non-
socioeconomic CMP categories proposed by Prosser’s scales (2014) (Table 3), while they 
use, in the case of Wagner and Meyer (2017), the categories suggested by Bakker and 
Hobolt’s CMP modified measures (2013). 
 
Ideological distance 
 Differences in radicalism between NRLPs and SRLPs are analyzed by exploring 
their ideological distances to the major social democratic parties of their countries (H4). 
The ideological distance between RLPs and their national center-left parties is measured 
for each year both with data from the CMP and CHES and is calculated as the difference 
between their positions on the economic left-right dimension. We then average those 
values and aggregate them for each group of RLPs and period of analysis. 
The criterion used for the selection of the most relevant social democratic parties 
was that they were the center-left party that consistently had the best results in the 
legislative elections of their respective countries. It should be noted that, with the 
exception of Cypriot KS-EDEK and the Icelandic Alliance (S) – which have been 
overtaken by their national radical left parties (AKEL and VG) – all these social 
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democratic parties have been the most voted left-wing parties in their countries over the 
last two decades. 
 
Table 5. Social Democratic parties (SDs) included in the study. 
 
Country Parties 
Cyprus KS-EDEK – Movement of Social Democrats EDEK (Kinima Sosialdimokraton) 
Denmark SD – Social Democracy in Denmark (Socialdemokraterne) 
Finland SDP - Social Democratic Party of Finland (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen 
Puolue) 
Greece PASOK – Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima) 
Iceland S – Alliance – Social Democratic Party of Iceland (Samfylkingin - 
Jafnaðarmannaflokkur Íslands)a 
Italy PD – Democratic Party (Partito Democratico)b 
Norway Ap/DNA – Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet) 
Portugal PS – Socialist Party (Partido Socialista) 
Spain PSOE – Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) 
Sweden 
 
SAP – Social Democratic Workers’ Party (Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet) 
 
Source: parties-and-elections.eu (data retrieved in 12 September 2017). 
a as Social Democratic Party (AF) until 1995; b as Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) from 1991 to 1998, 
and Democrats of the Left (DS) from 1998 to 2007. 
 
  
Confirmation of the hypotheses 
 Finally, and before proceeding to the discussion of results, we must define the 
criteria for the confirmation of our hypotheses and apply them systematically throughout 
our analysis. In this case, we consider our hypotheses as “confirmed” when both databases 
(CHES and CMP) present results that go in the proposed direction with statistical 
significance (in cases where statistical analysis is performed). In the cases where only one 
of the datasets confirms the direction of our hypothesis with statistical significance, we 
will consider the hypothesis as “partially confirmed”, whether the results presented by the 
other dataset go in the direction proposed by our hypothesis or the opposite. 
However, as mentioned above, our work presents an important limitation related to 
our small sample size (n), which makes it difficult to obtain statistical significance in the 
differences that we may find between the average positions of NRLPs and SRLPs. Thus, 
and for this reason, in cases where the results are concordant between the two datasets and 
go in the direction proposed by our hypothesis, we will consider that, although it can not 
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be confirmed, the results nevertheless “suggest” that our hypothesis may be correct. In all 
other situations, the hypotheses will simply be considered as “not confirmed”. 
Next, and after presenting the methodological approach and the empirical methods 
that we use for the comparative study of the ideological differences between NRLPs and 
SRLPs, we will now turn to the chapter that presents and discusses the results of our work. 
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Chapter 5 
Comparing Nordic and Southern RLPs’ ideological 
differences 
 
 
This chapter presents and critically discusses the empirical results of this study and 
how they address the ideological differences between Nordic and Southern European 
RLPs. It starts with a descriptive analysis of the disaggregated data, describing the 
individual positions of RLPs in each ideological dimension and how these have evolved 
over time. This allows us to highlight the most relevant differences between these parties 
as well as other detailed information that may be helpful for better understanding those 
differences. It then proceeds with the analysis of each cluster of parties – Nordic and 
Southern European – both by looking at their consistency and internal coherence, and the 
implications these may have for a direct comparison between the two groups. Finally, we 
present the data in the aggregated form, accompanied by the results of the statistical tests 
and compare between the NRLPs and SRLPs results, responding to our theoretical 
hypotheses. 
This chapter concludes with an overview of the results presenting a hypothesis 
confirmation summary and a visual map of RLPs’ positions in the different ideological 
scales provided by each dataset. We argue that despite the existing ideological differences 
between Nordic and Southern European RLPs, these do not appear to be relevant enough 
to consider the existence of two well-defined region-based ideological subgroups of RLPs. 
 
 
5.1. Issue positions 
 
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, ‘ideology’ is conceptually a function of both issue 
position and issue salience (Rovny, 2012, p. 275). In this section, we analyze the issue 
positions of RLPs and of each regional cluster in the three ideological dimensions that we 
consider to be the most relevant for the European party space of competition – the 
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economic left-right, GAL-TAN and European integration dimensions. A description is 
made on how these positions have evolved over time and in specific periods of time that 
are expected to have had an impact on RLPs positioning behavior (particularly in the post-
2008 economic crisis period). This analysis begins with the dimension that is perhaps the 
most determinant for distinguishing between political parties’ ideological positions: the 
economic left-right dimension. 
 
Positions on the economic left-right dimension 
 In hypothesis H1a, we hypothesize that Southern European RLPs take more leftist 
positions in traditional socioeconomic issues than Nordic RLPs. However, and in order to 
confirm this, we first need to look at the individual results for each party and their 
evolution over time in both datasets (CMP and CHES). Figures 1a and 1b show the results 
obtained with CHES data and reveal a consistent positioning of all RLPs on the left-wing 
side of the economic left-right scale (from 0 to 2.5 in an 11-point scale), as would be 
expected from radical left parties. The only unusual case seems to be that of the Greek 
SYRIZA which takes more moderate positions in this scale between 1999 and 2002 (3.6 
and 2.9, respectively) (see Figure 1b). 
 
	
Figure 1a. Nordic RLPs’ positions on the economic left-right (CHES, 1999-2014). 
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 In the data provided by the CHES dataset, NRLPs’ positions in the economic left-
right dimension look fairly consistent over time and do not vary significantly (Figure 1a). 
In general, their positions are all in a range that goes between 1 and 2.2. The Danish EL 
and the Swedish V appear here as the most economically left-wing parties of the Nordic 
Green Left, while the Danish SF confirms the literature and positions as the most 
‘moderate’ Nordic RLP over the years. 
 
	
Figure 1b. Southern European RLPs’ positions on the economic left-right (CHES, 1999-2014). 
 
 In the case of SRLPs, their positions vary somewhat more sharply (Figure 1b). In 
addition to the aforementioned case of SYRIZA between 1999 and 2002, the Iberian RLPs 
(IU, PCP and BE) also adopted less radical positions back in 1999 and have later moved 
further to the left (mainly the PCP and the BE). But the most radical parties in the 
economic left-right dimension appear to be Southern European RLPs such as the Greek 
KKE, the Italian RC and the PCP, suggesting that our hypothesis that they take more leftist 
positions than NRLPs (H1a) may find empirical support. This somewhat confirms the idea 
that conservative communist parties are economically more radical than the remaining 
SRLPs, which can influence the position of the ‘whole’ SRLP group in this dimension. On 
the opposite side, the most moderate RLPs appear to be the Danish SF, the Finnish VAS 
and the Cypriot AKEL – for which CHES only provides data for 2014 – but whose 
moderate position among SRLPs may be partly explained by the fact that this party had 
been in government for ten years (2003-2013) right before the 2014 CHES survey wave.  
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 In terms of the internal coherence of the Southern European cluster, these parties 
too are positioned in a relatively well defined range on the left-side of the economic scale 
(from 0 to 2), although with somewhat more radical parties than the Nordic group. This 
coherence allows us to proceed with the aggregation of the data and compare between 
these two groups without the risk of masking variations that may have a significant impact 
in our results. In addition, it would have been interesting to also have data on the Icelandic 
VG as this party is thought to be one of the most moderate European RLPs and its 
inclusion could help us achieve a clearer distinction between the two groups of parties. 
 The CMP results are quite different from those provided by CHES. As can be seen 
in Figures 2a and 2b, party positions in this dataset are less consistent over time and 
present significant variations between observations (i.e. between the subsequent election 
manifestos of each party). The greater variation in CMP results was already expected due 
to the nature of this data – as discussed in the methodological chapter – but it should be 
noted that this makes it difficult to make a detailed descriptive analysis of the RLPs’ 
positions based on the CMP. 
 
 
Figure 2a. Nordic RLPs’ positions on the economic left-right (CMP, 1989-2016). 
 
 Looking at the results of NRLPs in the CMP (Figure 2a), it can be seen that, like in 
CHES, the vast majority of these parties adopt economic positions close to the left-wing 
side of the economic left-right scale. On average, NRLP positions range from 1 to 3. One 
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of the trends that seems to happen over the years is the progressive shift of these parties 
into more radical left-wing economic positions, especially since the second half of the 
2000s. The reason why this have happened may be difficult to explain with the available 
information and, specially, because it is not possible to compare it with the CHES data due 
to time coverage issues. 
 In Figure 2a, the Swedish V and the Norwegian SV are again highlighted as the 
Nordic parties that take more leftist positions on economic issues. On the other hand, the 
Danish EL – unlike in CHES – appears as one of the more moderate parties of the Nordic 
Green Left, along with the Icelandic VG and the Danish SF. Another aspect worthy of note 
is the fact that this dataset indicates, contrary to what is suggested by the literature and by 
CHES results, a displacement of the Danish SF to the left-wing economic side, when this 
party is considered to have been de-radicalized over the years and even recently joined the 
European Greens party family. 
 
 
Figure 2b. Southern RLPs’ positions on the economic left-right (CMP, 1989-2016). 
 
The CMP results for SRLPs are more difficult to analyze (Figure 2b). First of all, 
because the vast majority of these parties do not present stable positions over time and do 
not allow an identification of clear evolutionary trends as with CHES data. In addition, 
some of these results are contradictory with the data from the expert surveys and, in many 
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cases, are even implausible from the point of view of the existing knowledge about the 
economic positions of some of these parties. 
In particular, in Figure 2b, it stands out the positioning of the Greek KKE, which is 
considered the most orthodox and radical of the European RLPs. This communist party 
sometimes adopts some of the most moderate positions among the SRLPs, and even has 
observations close to the economic political center (e.g. 2009). Another identical example 
is the positioning of the Greek SYRIZA in the 2015 legislative elections, whose economic 
policy program in that year was quite radical and proposed a confrontation with the 
European institutions (and their economic orientations), but which is here classified as 
quite moderate (4) when compared to those of the remaining RLPs. However, the 
inconsistency of the positions of a party may correspond to actual changes in its economic 
manifesto and does not mean that it is not the other database (CHES) that may be 
‘incorrect’. Note also the case of the Spanish IU, which in the CMP is presented as 
economically very radical (average position of 0.8), but that in CHES is portrayed as the 
least radical SRLP on economic issues (average position of 1.8). 
Finally, it is important to underline the positioning of two other RLPs: the Spanish 
Podemos and the Italian SEL. These are the two most recent RLPs included in our study 
and are integrated into very few analyzes that measure and compare RLPs’ positions. We 
proposed their integration into the existing frameworks and analyze how they position 
themselves in the scenario of the European radical left. The SEL, although it had since 
dissolved into the Sinistra Italiana (December 2016), played a major role in the Italian 
radical left during the ‘dark’ years of the Communist Refoundation (RC). In the case of 
Podemos, as it is known, it is currently the main political force of the Spanish radical left, 
having surpassed the IU. However, in both databases, these two parties seem to fit within 
the radical left’s economic ideological spectrum, although in the CMP results they appear 
as taking more radical economic positions than in CHES. 
When we aggregate the data from these two groups of parties, we find that the 
SRLPs seem to adopt, on average, more left-wing economic positions than NRLPs 
(Figures 3a and 3b), as suggested by our hypothesis H1a. This happens for the results 
from both datasets, with the exception of the 2009-2017 period of analysis of the CMP. 
However, and although these differences are consistent across the two datasets, they only 
present a slight statistical significance (p ≤ 0.1) for the CHES period of 2009-2017, which  
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Figures 3a & 3b. Party positions on the economic left-right. Expert survey (CHES) and Comparative manifesto data (CMP). 
The levels of statistical significance of the t-test are: ***p < 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05; +p ≤ 0.1. 
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is precisely the one that are contradicted by the results provided by CMP. Thus, and 
although both the aggregated and disaggregated results suggest that most SRLPs do indeed 
take more leftist positions in the economic left-right dimension, our hypothesis H1a could 
not be confirmed. 
 
Re-radicalization since the 2008 economic crisis 
Our hypothesis H1b intends to confirm a supposed economic re-radicalization of 
SRLPs after 2008, due to the unequal impacts of the economic crisis in Southern European 
countries. Although it is not clear that even if a radicalization has occurred, it was due to 
the effects of the economic crisis, Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present and compare the average 
positions of each RLP for the periods before and after the onset of the crisis (2008). We 
analyze position change in the Economic left-right scale in order to confirm if, on average, 
they started adopting more left-wing positions since 2008. 
 
Table 6.1. Post-2008 radicalization in the economic left-right scale (0-10). Expert survey data 
(CHES). 
 
 
Change on the economic Left-Right (CHES) 
 
 
 
1999-2008 2009-2017 
  Party Average position 
Average 
position Change 
Re-radicalized since 
2008? 
KKE (gr) 0,5 0,1 -0,4 yes 
PCP (por) 1,5 0,4 -1,1 yes 
AKEL (cyp) n.a. 2,0 n.a. - 
SYRIZA (gr) 2,5 1,2 -1,3 yes 
BE (por) 1,9 0,9 -1,0 yes 
IU (spa) 2,0 1,6 -0,4 yes 
Podemos (spa) n.a. 1,3 n.a. - 
RC (it) 0,5 0,4 -0,1 yes 
SEL(it) n.a. 1,3 n.a. - 
Total SRLPs 1,5 1,0 -0,5 yes 
        EL (dk) 1,1 0,9 -0,2 yes 
SF (dk) 2,1 2,3 +0,2 no 
VAS (fin) 1,9 1,9 0 no 
V (sv) 1,5 1,3 -0,2 yes 
SV (nor) n.a. 1,6 n.a. - 
VG (ice) n.a. n.a. n.a. - 
Total NRLPs 1,7 1,6 -0,1 yes 
All RLPs 1,6 1,2 -0,4 yes 
        n.a. = data not available 
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The results obtained from CHES (Table 6.1) show that all SRLPs take, on average, 
more leftist economic positions during the 2009-2017 period, compared to the previous 
one (1999-2008). The size of this re-radicalization seems to be relevant in all parties for 
which we have sufficient data to make this comparison. Where this change is smaller – as 
in the case of the KKE and RC – their positions were already quite radical, which is why 
this re-radicalization would have always been potentially smaller. In the case of Nordic 
RLPs, the variations in their average positions are so small that it is difficult to say that 
significant changes have occurred between the pre- and post-crisis periods. The CHES 
results therefore suggest the confirmation of our hypothesis H1b. 
 
Table 6.2. Post-2008 radicalization in the economic left-right scale (0-10). Comparative manifesto 
data (CMP). 
 
 
Change on the economic Left-Right (CMP) 
 
 
 
1999-2008 2009-2017 
  Party Average position 
Average 
position Change 
Re-radicalized since 
2008? 
KKE (gr) 1,9 2,5 +0,6 no 
PCP (por) 1,3 2,3 +1,0 no 
AKEL (cyp) 3,0 2,5 -0,5 yes 
SYRIZA (gr) 2,0 3,1 +1,1 no 
BE (por) 1,8 1,9 +0,1 no 
IU (spa) 0,7 1,2 +0,5 no 
Podemos (spa) n.a. 1,1 n.a. - 
RC (it) 1,5 n.a. n.a. - 
SEL(it) n.a. 0,7 n.a. - 
Total SRLPs 1,7 1,9 +0,2 no 
        EL (dk) 2,4 1,6 -0,8 yes 
SF (dk) 2,5 1,1 -1,4 yes 
VAS (fin) 1,9 1,9 0 no 
V (sv) 0,8 1,0 +0,2 no 
SV (nor) 0,7 0,8 +0,1 no 
VG (ice) 2,4 3,1 +0,7 no 
Total NRLPs 1,8 1,6 -0,2 yes 
All RLPs 1,8 1,8 0 no 
        n.a. = data not available 
  
This suggestion, however, looks a bit different if we observe the evolution of the 
individual economic positions of each SRLPs over the years (as shown in Figure 1b in the 
previous section). We find that, although parties like the Portuguese BE and PCP have 
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turned to the left since 2008, a substantial part of that re-radicalization seems to have 
occurred to a large extent before 2008 and was already reflected in the results of the CHES 
2006 survey. This means that, in the event of a change in the average positions of SRLPs 
between the pre- and post-2008 periods, that re-radicalization may not coincide with the 
timing of the crisis. However, it should be noted that from 2006 to 2010-2014 (Figure 1b), 
there were significant movements to the left in parties such as the PCP, BE or the IU. 
Apart from the doubts raised by CHES results, in light with the ideological 
evolution of SRLPs over the last years (Figure 1b), the results obtained from the CMP also 
contradict the CHES from Table 6.1. In the data provided by the CMP, most SRLPs do not 
adopt more leftist positions after 2008 (Table 6.2). And if we look at the evolution of the 
individual economic positions of SRLPs in the CMP (Figure 2b), we find that only the BE 
and AKEL have slightly modified their economic positions in relation to the years prior to 
the 2008 crisis. For these reasons, we conclude that, although initially the CHES results 
may have suggested an eventual re-radicalization of the Southern European radical left 
after the 2008 crisis, this hypothesis (H1b) is not empirically confirmed by our results.
 Although it is difficult to understand why this does not seem to have happened – 
contrary to Fagerholm’s conclusions (2016) – a possible explanation may lie in the fact 
that, in the face of an “austeritarian” neoliberal offensive, RLPs may have decided to 
present more “defensive” economic programs, gathering around the proposals traditionally 
associated with the old European social democracy (e.g. protection of the welfare state). Or 
instead, that the real impact of this crisis on their ideological positioning is yet reflected in 
expert analysis or in the electoral manifestos of these parties. In either case, it would be 
necessary to study this empirically and in greater depth. 
 
Positions on the GAL-TAN dimension 
The hypothesis we advanced was that NRLPs would adopt more liberal/libertarian 
(GAL) positions than SRLPs in the new politics/GAL-TAN dimension (H2a). In this case, 
both CHES and CMP results seem to confirm the idea that this dimension (and non-
socioeconomic issues) are currently one of the major sources of internal diversity among 
RLPs, even more than the traditional economic left-right dimension. And, according to our 
results, this diversity (or variety) seems to occur more markedly among the Southern 
European RLPs, even if it can also be found within the Nordic Green Left. 
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Figure 4a. Nordic RLPs’ positions on the GAL-TAN (CHES, 1999-2014). 
  
 The data provided by CHES for the GAL-TAN dimension (Figure 4a) once again 
demonstrates a high consistency in Nordic RLPs’ positions over time. In fact, it is only in 
the 2014 survey that substantial changes in the positions of these parties appear to have 
taken place in this dimension. If, on one hand, there seems to be a slight moderation on the 
part of the Danish SF – until then, one of the most GAL of all NRLPs – on the other hand, 
this is followed by the radicalization of the Finnish VAS and the Swedish V towards the 
GAL axis of this dimension. 
 In the GAL-TAN dimension, similarly to what happens in the economic left-right 
scale, the Danish EL and the Norwegian SV are the Nordic parties with more radical 
average positions throughout the whole period under analysis. In addition, it is also 
important to emphasize the internal consistency of the positions among Nordic RLPs, 
which more easily justifies an aggregation of the data of these parties for a direct 
comparison with Southern European RLPs. 
The CHES positions for SRLPs in the GAL-TAN dimension are much more 
diverse than those of the NRLPs, and this group presents a much lower internal coherence 
(Figure 4b). If on the one hand we have a significant number of SRLPs that occupy more 
libertarian (GAL) positions than any of the Nordic parties – IU, RC, BE, SEL – on the 
other hand, it is in the Southern European countries that we find the most conservative 
RLPs (TANs) in this dimension. These results were expected since the literature refers to 
the conservative communist parties – KKE and PCP – and the Cypriot AKEL as the most  
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Figure 4b. Southern European RLPs’ positions on the GAL-TAN (CHES, 1999-2014). 
 
conservative and least connected to post-materialist values RLPs of our study. However, in 
Figure 4b, it is also important to point out the significant changes that at some point in 
time, both the Portuguese PCP (since 2014) and the Greek KKE (since 2002) seem to have 
adopted in their positioning on this ideological dimension – a radical move towards the 
TAN axis – and whose justification would deserve a more in-depth research. 
Therefore, the CHES results suggest that although most SRLPs take positions that 
are markedly more libertarian than NRLPs’ – contrary to our initial hypothesis (H2a) – the 
fact that this group includes three parties with rather orthodox and conservative positions, 
can significantly influence the average position of the whole Southern European group, 
pulling it to less radical positions in this scale. In this case, data aggregation becomes 
slightly more problematic as the results may mask, to some extent, the greater internal 
variety that exists among Southern European RLPs. 
In the results obtained with the CMP data (Figures 5a and 5b), the GAL-TAN 
dimension also presents a large variation of positions for each RLP. This lower consistency 
of positions over time complicates the analysis of evolution trends in the positioning of 
each RLP, as mentioned above. In general, since most of the RLPs are considered to be 
quite ‘libertarian’ parties, it is surprising that we find a reasonable number of observations 
in which RLPs appear at positions closer to the TAN axis (values above 5) than to the 
GAL axis. While this might have been expected, to some extent, in some of the 
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conservative communists’ observations, it was not certainly the case for parties such as the 
Greek SYRIZA or the Portuguese BE. 
 
 
Figure 5a. Nordic RLPs’ positions on the GAL-TAN (CMP, 1989-2016). 
 
 In the specific case of the Nordic RLPs (Figure 5a), these parties present very 
different positions and behaviors over the years. It is possible to identify NRLPs whose 
positions are relatively stable over time – e.g. the Finnish VAS – but also others in which 
they vary in such a way that it becomes difficult to identify a clear trend – e.g. the 
Norwegian SV. In addition, great inconsistencies were found among some of these results 
and the ones provided by CHES, being perhaps the most flagrant case that of the Swedish 
V, that CHES identifies as the most GAL party of all NRLPs, and here it appears as having 
largely moderated its position in this dimension. 
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Figure 5b. Southern European RLPs’ positions on the GAL-TAN (CMP, 1989-2016). 
 
In terms of Southern European RLPs, there are some trends that should be 
highlighted in these results provided by the CMP (Figure 5b). First of all, the KKE, the 
AKEL and the PCP are identified as the most distant parties from the GAL axis, when 
compared to the remaining SRLPs. This confirms not only the CHES results but also our 
review of the literature. On another level, the existing diversity within the Southern 
European RLPs allows the identification some other clear evolution trends that are in 
agreement with the results obtained with CHES: this is the case of the more liberal 
positioning of parties such as the Italian RC, the Spanish Podemos or the Italian SEL. 
Finally, it should be noted once again that Podemos and SEL are perfectly integrated in the 
ideological spectrum of the radical left party family. As in the economic left-right 
dimension, the Podemos with more moderate positions than those of SEL. 
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Figures 6a & 6b. Party positions on the GAL-TAN. Expert survey (CHES) and Comparative manifesto data (CMP). 
The levels of statistical significance of the t-test are: ***p < 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05; +p ≤ 0.1. 
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In the case of the GAL-TAN dimension, the aggregation of data and the 
comparison between the groups of NRLPs and SRLPs seems to be facilitated by the fact 
that CMP results provide far more stable positions than they did for the economic left-right 
scale. This happens despite the greater ideological diversity of RLPs in the GAL-TAN 
dimension than in the economic left-right. In fact, the discrepancies between the results of 
the two groups across datasets are also reflected in their aggregate analysis (Figures 6a 
and 6b): while in CHES data, the average positions of NRLPs and SRLPs are very close 
and there are no significant differences between them; in the CMP data, they suggest that 
Nordic RLPs adopt, on average, more GAL positions than SRLPs in all the periods 
analyzed. However, those differences present statistical significance only for one of those 
time periods (1999-2008) and are not echoed in the results obtained through CHES data. It 
is therefore not possible to confirm our hypothesis H2a and affirm that Nordic RLPs 
adopt more libertarian (GAL) positions than Southern European RLPs. 
In fact, it is difficult to perform a comparison between NRLPs and SRLPs in the 
GAL-TAN dimension because, as we have seen before, SRLPs do not present an internal 
coherence in their positions on non-socioeconomic/post-materialist issues, that allows 
them to be treated as a cohesive and homogeneous group on this dimension. There seems 
to be a big contrast between the parties with a strong ideological tradition linked to the 
Soviet world – PCP, KKE and AKEL – and the remaining SRLPs. In addition, both 
datasets confirm the idea that the GAL-TAN dimension and non-socioeconomic issues are 
good for capturing the differences between RLPs (Gomez et al., 2016): as we can see, the 
positions among RLPs in this dimension are wider and more diverse than in the economic 
left-right dimension, where RLPs are positioned on a narrower range of values, specially in 
the case of Nordic RLPs. 
 
Positions on the European integration dimension 
Regarding the European integration dimension, our hypothesis H3a suggests that 
NRLPs take more Eurosceptical positions than SRLPs. Although the results obtained do 
not allow the confirmation of this hypothesis, they suggest the existence of a more 
Eurosceptic tendency among Nordic RLPs and conservative communist parties. The results 
in this dimension also confirm that the attitudes towards the process of European 
integration are also an important source of diversity among radical left parties. 
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Unlike the results for the previous two dimensions – economic left-right and GAL-
TAN – in the European integration, the positions obtained from both datasets are more 
stable over time, allowing a clearer and more detailed descriptive analysis. This difference 
on the variation and consistency of positions over time may be partly due to the fact that 
this scale is ‘constructed’ from only two categories of the CMP dataset, a much lower 
number than the 19 and 14 of the other two dimensions. 
In this case, the results from expert surveys (CHES) show a great diversity in the 
Euroscepticism levels among RLPs and reveal the existence of two distinct Eurosceptic 
poles within each of the RLPs subgroups, Nordic and South European. 
 
 
Figure 7a. Nordic RLPs’ positions on the European integration (CHES, 1992-2014). 
 
In Figure 7a, we can identify a strongly Eurosceptic pole among the Nordic radical 
left, consisting of three parties whose positions are very Eurosceptic during the whole 
period under review – the Swedish V, the Danish EL and the Norwegian SV – and a more 
neutral pole (or more sympathetic) towards the EU – made up of the Finnish VAS and the 
Danish SF. In both cases, it is possible to detect a tendency of some moderation in relation 
to European issues over the years, although this is much more pronounced in some cases 
like that of the Danish SF. While it seems difficult to justify the position change of the 
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Finnish VAS since 1999 (perhaps due to the adherence to the single currency or the 
country’s economic success of the late 1990s?), the recent evolution of the Danish SF 
seems to explain itself with the process of ideological ‘aggiornamento’ that the literature 
refers that have occurred with this party and eventually culminated with its adhesion to the 
euro-enthusiastic European party of the Greens. 
 
 
Figure 7b. Southern European RLPs’ positions on the European integration (CHES, 1992-2014). 
 
 The range of positions found among NRLPs seems to repeat itself in the case of the 
SRLPs (Figure 7b). If among NRLPs, the average positions in the CHES data ranges from 
1.6 and 4.2; in SRLPs, these fluctuate between very similar values (1.1 and 4.6). It should 
be noted, however, that the breadth of positions towards European integration starts by 
being much higher in the first years that are covered by the dataset (1992 to 2002), and 
above all because of the strong pro-European position of the Greek SYRIZA that, 
throughout the years, has always contrasted with the Euro-rejectionism of the Greek KKE. 
 The positions of the remaining SRLPs are also interesting to analyze in more detail: 
with the exception of the KKE, no other SRLP adopts as anti-EU positions as the three 
most Eurosceptic Nordic RLPs (V, SV, EL). In the case of SRLPs, it is also possible to 
identify a more Eurosceptic pole consisting of – besides the KKE – the Italian RC, and the 
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Portuguese PCP and BE. On the other hand, the remaining SRLPs seem to have been 
moderating their Euroscepticism over the years and now take positions closer to 
‘neutrality’ towards the European integration, as we had already suggested when 
elaborating our hypothesis H3a. This is especially the case of the AKEL, IU and Podemos. 
 
 
Figure 8a. Nordic RLPs’ positions on the European integration (CMP, 1989-2016). 
 
 The CMP results also seem to confirm that Nordic RLPs adopt, on average, more 
Eurosceptic positions than Southern European RLPs (Figures 8a and 8b). In the case of the 
NRLPs, virtually all parties – with the exception of the Finnish VAS – take negative 
positions in relation to the EU (values up to 4), whereas in SRLPs there are several cases of 
parties that contain observations above this value (i.e. sympathetic towards the EU). 
 In relation to the results provided by the expert surveys, the CMP data confirms the 
existence of the two distinct poles of Euroscepticism. Within the NRLPs, the Norwegian 
SV, the Swedish V and the Danish EL continue to appear, on average, as more Eurosceptic 
than the Danish SF and the Finnish VAS. To this, we add the results for the Icelandic VG, 
which is consistently positioned on the more ‘neutral’ side of the European integration 
dimension, and therefore in the least Eurosceptic pole of the Nordic Green Left. 
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Figure 8b. Southern European RLPs’ positions on the European integration (CMP, 1989-2016). 
 
 In terms of SRLPs’ Eurosceptic positions in the CMP data (Figure 8b), we 
highlight two aspects that we consider to be the most relevant for their analysis. First, the 
results confirm the existence of the aforementioned two poles of Euroscepticism: the most 
Eurosceptic consisting of the KKE, PCP, BE and RC (although the latter appears with an 
outlier value); and the other, less Eurosceptic, in which we can include the AKEL, IU and 
Podemos. Second, is the fact that the 2008 economic crisis seems to have had an impact on 
the attitudes of the SRLPs toward the European integration process: in data from CHES 
(Figure 7b), almost all SRLPs took more anti-EU positions in the period of 2009-2017 
than in 2006 (except for SYRIZA). On the contrary, and as expected, the same did not 
happen with NRLPs (Figure 7a), whose countries have been less affected by the crisis. 
These results are here partially confirmed by the CMP, except that, in the comparative 
manifesto data not all Southern European RLPs have adopted more anti-EU stances after 
2008. Finally, and once again, it should be pointed out that the Spanish Podemos and the 
Italian SEL are ideologically in line with the radical left’s Euroscepticism in both 
databases (Figures 7b and 8b), albeit within the so-called less Eurosceptic pole. 
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Figures 9a & 9b. Party positions on the European integration. Expert survey (CHES) and Comparative manifesto data (CMP). 
The levels of statistical significance of the t-test are: ***p < 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05; +p ≤ 0.1. 
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 The results for the European integration dimension appear to be consistent across 
both datasets. Conservative communists (KKE and PCP) are systematically placed as the 
most anti-EU RLPs in almost all periods of analysis, and are followed in terms of 
Euroscepticism by Nordic RLPs, with the remaining RLPs being the most “pro-
integration” parties of our study. This leads us to believe that the aggregation of data to 
compare between the two regional groups may suffer from the “pulling” effect of SRLPs to 
more Eurosceptic positions due to this kind of conservative communist Euro-rejectionism. 
The reading of the aggregate results must therefore bear this in mind, without ignoring the 
fact that a diversity of positioning also exists among the Nordic RLPs. 
 Being aware of this limitation for our analysis, we will now analyze the aggregate 
results and compare between NRLPs and SRLPs. Figures 9a and 9b show that NRLPs’ 
positions on the European integration scale are indeed, on average and for both datasets, 
closer to the anti-EU axis than those of SRLPs. However, these results are only statistically 
significant for one period of analysis (CMP, 1989-1999), whose direction, moreover, we 
can not confirm because the CHES does not provide data for the same period. Thus, 
although the results suggest that Nordic RLPs may on average be more Eurosceptic 
than Southern European RLPs, hypothesis H3a can not be confirmed empirically. 
 
Euroscepticism since the 2008 economic crisis 
In hypothesis H3b, we hypothesized that the Southern RLPs began to adopt more 
Eurosceptic positions in the European integration dimension since the beginning of the 
2008 economic crisis. The justification for this hypothesis was similar to that used in 
hypothesis H1b, namely the fact that these countries have been more affected by the 
economic crisis. The fact that they had been under strong austerity demands from the 
European institutions led us to hypothesize that this would be reflected in a more critical 
position towards the EU and the European integration process. 
In Tables 7.1 and 7.2, we compare the average positions of each RLP for the 
periods immediately before and after the onset of the economic crisis (2008), in order to 
identify a possible radicalization of SRLPs’ Eurosceptic positions towards a more anti-EU 
attitude. 
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Table 7.1. Post-2008 Euroscepticism in the European integration scale (1-7). Expert survey data 
(CHES). 
 
 
Change on the European integration (CHES) 
 
 
 
1999-2008 2009-2017 
  Party Average positions 
Average 
positions Change 
More Eurosceptical 
since 2008? 
KKE (gr) 1,1 1,1 0 no 
PCP (por) 3,0 2,5 -0,5 yes 
AKEL (cyp) n.a. 4,5 n.a. - 
SYRIZA (gr) 4,7 2,8 -1,9 yes 
BE (por) 3,3 3,4 +0,1 no 
IU (spa) 3,0 4,7 +0,5 no 
Podemos (spa) n.a. 4,4 n.a. - 
RC (it) 3,2 2,7 -0,5 yes 
SEL(it) n.a. 3,8 n.a. - 
Total SRLPs 3,1 3,3 +0,2 no 
        EL (dk) 1,6 1,8 +0,2 no 
SF (dk) 3,1 4,6 +1,5 no 
VAS (fin) 4,6 4,2 -0,4 yes 
V (sv) 1,7 2,1 +0,4 no 
SV (nor) n.a. 1,6 n.a. - 
VG (ice) n.a. n.a. n.a. - 
Total NRLPs 2,8 2,9 +0,1 no 
All RLPs 2,9 3,2 +0,3 no 
        n.a. = data not available 
 
In Table 7.1, CHES results show that only half of SRLPs adopted more Eurosceptic 
positions in the period after 2008 and that this was not a generalized trend among these 
parties. In the cases where it is possible to compare the positions between the two periods, 
we find that only the Greek SYRIZA, the Portuguese PCP and the Italian RC present more 
Eurosceptic positions and, in the case of SYRIZA, this change seems to be much more 
related to the strong pro-European positions this party had until 2002 (6 on a scale of 1-7), 
rather than due to any post-2008 change (see Figure 7b). 
On the other hand, these results hide some other important information for our 
analysis. In the case of the Greek KKE, its position on the European integration scale has 
always been very low (close to 1) and it would not have been possible for it to radicalize 
its position any further. In addition, when looking at the variation of the individual results 
of each SRLP between 2006 and 2010 (Figure 7b), we do see a change towards more 
Eurosceptic positions in parties other than those mentioned here (as is the case of the 
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Portuguese BE). On the contrary, the economic crisis, which has also affected the Spain, 
does not appear to have had a significant impact on IU’s moderate positions vis-à-vis the 
European integration process. It should also be added that in the case of the NRLPs, there 
were no significant changes in terms of Euroscepticism between the two time periods. 
 
Table 7.2. Post-2008 Euroscepticism in the European integration scale (1-7). Comparative 
manifesto data (CMP). 
 
 
Change on the European integration (CMP) 
 
 
 
1999-2008 2009-2017 
  Party Average positions 
Average 
positions Change 
More Eurosceptical 
since 2008? 
KKE (gr) 2,1 2,0 -0,1 yes 
PCP (por) 3,6 1,6 -2,0 yes 
AKEL (cyp) 4,7 5,0 +0,3 no 
SYRIZA (gr) 2,9 2,9 0 no 
BE (por) 3,6 2,4 -1,2 yes 
IU (spa) 3,8 2,5 -1,3 yes 
Podemos (spa) n.a. 4,5 n.a. - 
RC (it) 5 n.a. n.a. - 
SEL(it) n.a. 3,8 n.a. - 
Total SRLPs 3,7 3,1 -0,6 yes 
        EL (dk) 2,4 3,2 +0,8 no 
SF (dk) 3,1 4,7 +1,6 no 
VAS (fin) 3,3 4 +0,7 no 
V (sv) 2,1 4 +1,9 no 
SV (nor) 1,7 2,4 +0,7 no 
VG (ice) 2,8 3,8 +1,0 no 
Total NRLPs 2,6 3,7 +1,1 no 
All RLPs 3,2 3,3 +0,1 no 
        n.a. = data not available 
 
 In the case of the CMP results (Table 7.2), they seem to confirm our initial 
hypothesis of a generalized change among Southern European RLPs in the direction of a 
greater Euroscepticism between the periods of 1999-2008 and 2009-2017. Among the 
parties where it is possible to make that comparison, half of them (PCP, BE and IU) 
present considerable changes in their positioning (between -1.2 and -2.0). On the contrary, 
among the Nordic RLPs, there are no changes in direction of greater Euroscepticism and 
all adopt, on average, less Eurosceptic positions than in the post-2008 period. 
Looking back at Figure 8b, where we presented the CMP results for the positions of 
SRLPs in the European integration dimension, we can confirm this increase in 
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Euroscepticism in parties such as the KKE, PCP, IU, BE. Curiously, it is the parties that 
have recently emerged (Podemos and SEL) that tend not to adopt such Eurosceptic 
positions as the rest of the SRLPs, especially in the case of the Podemos which seems to be 
one of those that takes more pro-European positions despite having been created at the 
height of the European crisis. If these positions are strategic or will consolidate in the 
coming years, it will have to be confirmed in future studies. 
Having analyzed the results provided by both datasets, and although there are some 
parties for which these do not correspond to the conclusions we draw from the evolution of 
their positions over time, we would say that even if the empirical results do not fully 
confirm our hypothesis H3b, they strongly suggest that in fact – and especially when 
compared to NRLPs – the SRLPs began to adopt more Eurosceptic positions since the 
economic crisis of 2008. 
Next, and since the comparative analysis between Nordic and Southern European 
RLPs in terms of issues positions is complete, it is now important to understand to what 
extent these ideological positions relate and correspond to an effective emphasis and 
salience give to those issues and if they translate into ideological differences between 
them. 
 
 
5.2. Issue salience 
 
Hypotheses 1c and 2b are related to the importance (salience) given by RLPs to 
different policy issues. We hypothesize that SRLPs give more emphasis to socioeconomic 
issues than NRLPs (H1c), and that NRLPs give more emphasis to non-socioeconomic 
issues than SRLPs (H2b). We recall that socioeconomic issues are those that are related to 
the economic left-right dimension, while the non-socioeconomic ones are those that relate 
to the new politics/GAL-TAN dimension. 
A major shortcoming for the analysis of these two hypotheses is the fact that the 
CHES only provides data on issue salience for economic and non-socioeconomic issues 
since 2014. However, and despite this limitation, the results based on this expert survey 
dataset suggest that hypothesis H1c may find empirical support (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10. Socioeconomic issue salience in CHES (2014). 
 
 The results for the year of 2014 (Figure 10) confirm that SRLPs give a very 
significant emphasis to socioeconomic issues and do so to a much greater extent than any 
of the Nordic RLPs. While the salience given by SRLPs to economic issues varies between 
the 8.8 values of Podemos and SEL, and the 10 value of the Portuguese PCP; in the case of 
the NRLPs, these range between the 5.7 of the Norwegian SV and the 7.4 of the Swedish 
V. These results go therefore in the direction suggested by our hypothesis H1c. 
 
 
Figure 11. Non-socioeconomic issue salience in CHES (2014). 
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 On the contrary, and in the case of the salience given to non-socioeconomic issues, 
the results from CHES do not allow the confirmation that the NRLPs give more emphasis 
to these issues than SRLPs (H2b), nor even to make a clear distinction between the two 
groups of RLPs (Figure 11). Among the parties that give greater emphasis to this type of 
issues in the CHES 2014 survey, we both find SRLPs such as the Spanish IU and the 
Italian RC, and Nordic parties such as the Norwegian SV and the Finnish VAS. Still, 
Figure 11 shows that there is a relevant number of SRLPs – the conservative communists 
and AKEL – whose salience given to non-socioeconomic issues is very low when 
compared with the remaining SRLPs. This great variety among Southern RLPs makes it 
difficult to directly compare the aggregate results of these two groups due to the lower 
internal coherence of this group. 
 On the other hand, and when we look at the results of these parties in the CMP 
dataset, it becomes increasingly difficult to make a parsimonious descriptive analysis, 
since the salience given both to socioeconomic (Figures 12a and 12b) and non-
socioeconomic issues (Figures 13a and 13b) shows a much greater variation (from 
manifesto to manifesto) and does not show clear trends in the evolution of the emphasis 
given to each of these themes. These results are (again) not entirely unexpected since it is 
comprehensible that, from election to election, and depending on the specific political 
context of each country, parties are more inclined to give more emphasis to some issues 
than others. As an example, we can here refer the case of the Portuguese BE in the 2011 
legislative elections: despite being a party known for its strong inclination towards post-
materialistic issues, the BE presented an exceptionally short electoral manifesto almost 
exclusively focused on economic policy measures for an immediate response to the 
economic crisis that then affected the country. A simple fact like this explains not only the 
extraordinarily low salience given to non-socioeconomic issues by BE in its 2011 
observation (see Figure 1b), but also many other less intuitive results that the CMP results 
present in this issue, as well as some of its inconsistency throughout the period of analysis. 
It is with this kind of caution in mind that we now seek to make some sense out of the 
apparent “chaos” that some of these results seems to bring us. 
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Figure 12a. Nordic RLPs’ salience on socioeconomic issues (CMP, 1989-2016). 
 
 In the case of the Nordic RLPs (Figure 12a), it seems possible to identify a 
trend of increasing salience given to socioeconomic issues in the electoral manifestos of 
these parties over time. Apparently, the Nordic RLPs have been dedicating an increasing 
space of their electoral manifestos to traditional economic issues, especially when 
compared with that of the 1990s. In this figure, is should be noted, for example, the 
evolution in the percentage values of parties such as the Swedish V, the Danish EL or the 
Finnish VAS, and how they have risen steadily over the years. This tendency contradicts, 
to a certain extent, our initial expectations and the theoretical argument that we developed 
for the elaboration of our hypothesis (H1c). We would expect the SRLPs to give more 
emphasis to these issues than NRLPs. In the same way, these results seem to contradict the 
data obtained through the CHES dataset and the literature that refers to Nordic Green Left 
as having been giving increasing importance to non-socioeconomic and post-materialist 
issues to the detriment of traditional economic themes, particularly since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall (Fagerholm, 2016). 
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Figure 12b. Southern European RLPs’ salience on socioeconomic issues (CMP, 1989-2016). 
 
 In the case of SRLPs (Figure 12b), the variation across time and across manifestos 
is much larger than that presented by NRLPs. It is somewhat surprising to see that parties 
like the Cypriot AKEL or the Greek KKE – which the results from CHES identify as RLPs 
that give great salience to economic issues – do not appear portrayed in the same way in 
the CMP results. In addition, some important methodological doubts are raised with regard 
to some specific observations: for example, when we find that the KKE presents highly 
divergent values between the observations for the 2004 (17%), 2007 (64%) and the 2009 
(0%) elections. This inconsistency across datasets does not mean that one can be 
considered as being “more correct” than the other, but it should alert us to the need for 
further discussion and debate about the use of these empirical methods. 
 Still, and despite the difficulties found for a descriptive analysis of these results, it 
is possible to verify parties for which the salience values for socioeconomic themes are 
relatively stable throughout the period under analysis. This seems to be the case of the 
Portuguese BE and PCP, or the Greek SYRIZA. The latter seems to have substantially 
increased the emphasis given to this type of issues in their manifestos especially since the 
2011 election, which is certainly not unrelated to the insolvency crisis that the Greek state 
was already facing at that time. Finally, Figure 12b also states that, on average, SRLPs 
seem to dedicate less space of their manifestos to socioeconomic issues when compared to 
the space dedicated to them by Nordic RLPs. This is contradictory with CHES results for 
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2014 and suggests a refutation of our initial hypothesis that these parties would give 
greater emphasis to socioeconomic issues than their counterparts from Northern Europe 
(H1c). 
 
 
Figure 13a. Nordic RLPs’ salience on non-socioeconomic issues (CMP, 1989-2016). 
 
In terms of issue salience given by NRLPs to non-socioeconomic themes (Figure 
13a), we seem to find the reverse of the results for socioeconomic issues. The CMP results 
show that the Nordic RLPs dedicate less and less space from their electoral manifestos to 
these issues. And if, on average, each NRLP spent between 40 to 50% of their manifestos 
on socioeconomic issues; here, non-socioeconomic issues occupy only between 30 to 40% 
of their electoral programs. This is again the opposite of what the results from CHES had 
suggested, indicating that the NRLPs would be the RLPs more focused on non-
socioeconomic issues. 
Looking at the individual results for each RLP it is possible to see that sometimes 
the CMP results show some agreement with the CHES dataset – for example, when it 
identifies the Norwegian SV as the Nordic RLP that gives more emphasis to non-
socioeconomic issues – and sometimes contradicts them, as when it places the Finnish 
VAS as the one in which this salience is lower. Still, and in conclusion, it seems that there 
is some degree of internal coherence in the salience given to non-socioeconomic issues by 
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the whole Nordic Green Left group, which allows us to move to the analysis of the 
aggregate data with some degree of security. 
 
 
Figure 13b. Southern European RLPs’ salience on non-socioeconomic issues (CMP, 1989-2016). 
 
In the results of SRLPs for non-socioeconomic issues (Figure 13b), we again find 
the same variation and inconsistency that had already been presented in the case for 
economic issues (see Figure 12b). However, we will not repeat over and over again the 
implications that this brings to our descriptive analysis of the disaggregated data. In this 
particular figure, we would though emphasize the small space that the two Portuguese 
RLPs – PCP and BE – dedicate to non-socioeconomic issues in their electoral manifestos, 
in a way that seems to be consistent over time. These values suggest a confirmation of the 
CHES results for these two parties. On the other hand, the same CHES datasets also 
assigns low salience values in the cases of the Greek KKE and AKEL, however these 
values do not find confirmation in the results here provided by the CMP. To a certain 
extent, this demonstrates how the results between these two datasets can be contradictory. 
Where there seems to be some agreement across the two datasets is in the 
identification of the Spanish IU and the Italian RC as the Southern European RLPs that 
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give more emphasis to non-socioeconomic issues, and the fact that the results for Podemos 
and SEL once again show them fitting in the general landscape of the Southern European 
radical left, as it has already happened in terms of their positioning on the three main 
ideological dimensions of competition. 
Finally, the analysis of the CMP (Figures 13a and 13b) show that the percentage of 
manifesto space dedicated, on average, to non-socioeconomic issues does not seem to 
present great differences between Nordic and Southern European RLPs, which is precisely 
what we analyze next, by comparing the aggregate data of each group of RLPs. 
 
 
Figure 14a. Issue salience. Expert survey data (CHES, 2014). Data only available for the year 
2014. The levels of statistical significance of the t-test are: ***p < 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05; +p ≤ 0.1. 
 
 When we dive into the aggregated data, in terms of the CHES results (Figure 14a), 
in fact, and on average, SRLPs give more emphasis to socioeconomic issues than NRLPs 
(9.2 vs 6.6, with strong statistical significance); and NRLPs give more emphasis to non-
socioeconomic issues than SRLPs (6.2 vs 5.2, with no statistical significance). However, 
when we look at the detailed results (Figures 10 and 11), we find that there is an 
unbalanced contribution of the two conservative communist parties and AKEL for the 
average values of SRLPs: while sharing similar values with other SRLPs on economic 
issues (9.6 vs 9.2), the same does not apply to non-socioeconomic issues (3.0 vs 5.9). This 
means that, in fact, if we excluded conservative communists from this analysis, the 
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differences between NRLPs and SRLPs on non-socioeconomic issues would be even 
narrower than the ones shown in Figure 14a. 
 
 
Figure 14b. Issue salience. Comparative manifesto data (CMP). The levels of statistical significance of the 
t-test are: ***p < 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05; +p ≤ 0.1. 
 
 As in some of the hypotheses already analyzed, the CMP results for issue salience 
are again contradictory with those from CHES and end up discarding hypotheses H1c and 
H2b. Here, Figure 14b shows that greater emphasis is placed on socioeconomic issues by 
NRLPs (with statistical significance for all periods) and no significant differences are 
found in the salience given by both groups of RLPs to non-socioeconomic issues. It is also 
interesting to note that, in this same figure, NRLPs significantly increased their emphasis 
on socioeconomic issues in the period of 2009-2017, contrary to our expectations: 
Fagerholm (2016) describes an increasing emphasis on socioeconomic issues, but on the 
part of SRLPs, which could be due to a reaction to the 2008 economic crisis that affected 
most of the Southern European countries. That increased emphasis, however, was not 
found on our empirical results. For the above mentioned reasons, it is not possible to 
confirm our two salience-based hypotheses (H1c and H2b) nor draw any definitive 
conclusions on issue salience differences between Nordic and Southern RLPs. 
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 Although these results do not confirm our initial expectations, it would be 
important to try to advance with some possible explanations for the different results 
obtained from the two databases. In our opinion, this can be due to the fact that these 
datasets may be actually measuring different things. While the CHES survey asks experts 
to rate the salience given by a party to “economic” and “libertarian/traditional” issues; in 
the case of the CMP dataset, issue salience values are given by the space that the CMP 
categories related to those issues occupy in party manifestos. Well, it is not at all 
implausible that a party can still give high salience to certain issues in its political 
discourse and party ideology without it necessarily corresponding to a large space of their 
manifesto dedicated to them. This could also help to understand the greater variation found 
among the CMP results, since both the size and structure of manifestos can vary 
significantly from election to election, greatly influencing the results obtained on this 
scale. 
 
 
5.3. Ideological distance to social democratic parties 
 
 Hypothesis 4 states that Nordic RLPs “are ideologically closer to the major social 
democratic party of their countries in the economic left-right dimension” (H4) and that this 
can be a possible explanation to why they are perceived as being less radical than Southern 
European RLPs in their own national context. However, the results obtained from the two 
datasets follow in different directions and do not allow their cross-validation. 
The results from CHES (Figures 15a and 15b) identify a clear difference in the 
ideological distances between NRLPs and SRLPs, relatively to social democratic parties. 
As can be seen over the whole period under analysis, in most cases NRLPs are 
ideologically closer to social democratic parties (Figure 15a) than SRLPs (Figure 15b), in 
terms of the economic left-right scale. Whereas for Nordic parties these differences are 
always in a range between 1.1 (VAS in 2006) and 3 (EL in 2010); in Southern European 
parties, this range is wider and goes from 1.7 (SYRIZA in 2002) to 5.5 (KKE in 2010). 
This suggests that the hypothesis that NRLPs are ideologically closer to social democratic 
parties (H4) and can therefore be perceived as being less radical, may be correct. 
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Figure 15a. Nordic RLPs’ ideological distance to social democratic parties in the economic left-
right (CHES, 1999-2014). 
 
In the individual results for NRLPs (Figure 15a), we find a relative stability in the 
distances that each of these parties maintain with their respective social democrat 
adversaries over time. In this figure, the Danish EL appears as the most ideologically 
distant RLP (which, to a certain extent, reinforces the results already discussed for 
hypothesis H1a), and the Finnish VAS and the Danish SF as the Nordic RLPs that are 
economically closer to the center-left of their respective countries. 
 
 
Figure 15b. Southern European RLPs’ ideological distance to social democratic parties in the 
economic left-right (CHES, 1999-2014). 
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The variation in the ideological distances of Southern European RLPs across time 
is higher than those presented by Nordic RLPs (Figure 15b). In this particular figure, it is 
worth highlighting the increase in the ideological distance that occurred in the Greek RLPs 
(KKE and SYRIZA) after 2008 (in this case, since 2010), which may show – in a certain 
way – a possible consequence of the polarization that the economic crisis brought to the 
Greek party system. The KKE is in fact, and by far, the most ideologically distant party 
from social democracy, among the SRLPs; but, in reality, there are a number of other 
SRLPs with average ideological distances higher than any Nordic RLP: PCP, SYRIZA, 
BE, RC, Podemos and SEL. On the other hand, the SRLPs that appear to be the closest to 
the center-left parties appear to be the Spanish IU and the Cypriot AKEL, but their values 
are nevertheless surpassed by only one of the NRLPs: the Danish EL. 
 
 
Figure 16a. Nordic RLPs’ ideological distance to social democratic parties in the economic left-
right (CMP, 1989-2016). 
 
When we turn to the analysis of the CMP results (Figures 16a and 16b), in addition 
to the significant variation and inconsistency of the observations, some results stand out as 
they are somewhat unexpected in light of the theory. There are several observations where 
RLPs appear as economically less left-wing than social democratic parties or, at least, they 
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appear very close to that. Take the case of the Danish SF (in 1990 and 1994), the Icelandic 
VG (in 2007), the Greek SYRIZA (in 2009) or – perhaps the most implausible and 
unexpected of them all – the Greek KKE (in 2009). Of course, these results may not be 
only due to the “moderation” of a particular RLP electoral manifesto, but also to the 
positioning that a social democratic party may decide to adopt at a given election. In this 
case, and looking at the database of our work12, we can give an example of PASOK – the 
main party of the Greek social democracy – that presents an extremely left-wing position 
for one of the years in question (0.9 on a 0-10 scale, in 2009). 
 
 
Figure 16b. Southern European RLPs’ ideological distance to social democratic parties in the 
economic left-right (CMP, 1989-2016). 
 
Like the aforementioned example (PASOK, 2009), many other observations were 
found in which social democratic parties adopted rather leftist positions in the economic 
left-right scale, even when it did not seem plausible that they were more leftist than RLPs, 
nor did appear to correspond to their real position on this dimension. This is only a sign of 
what may be one of the problems of using CMP data for measuring ideological distances 
between parties over time. For this reason, researchers sometimes resort to other ways of 
																																																						
12 Of our own development from the CHES and CMP datasets. For the sake of brevity of this work, it is not 
available here but can be made available on request. 
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measuring party positions, such as experts and voters’ surveys, which are based on 
perceptions instead of more objective data like this. 
Moreover, in general, the results obtained from each of these datasets do not seem 
to confirm each other, showing that there may be something wrong with some of these 
datasets. It is with this caution and being aware of some of these limitations that we 
proceed with the comparative analysis of the aggregate data for NRLPs and SRLPs in 
terms of their economical ideological distances for the main social democratic parties of 
their party systems. 
 
 
Figure 17a. Ideological distance to social democratic parties on the economic left-right. Expert 
survey data (CHES). 
The levels of statistical significance of the t-test are: ***p < 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05; +p ≤ 0.1. 
 
As the disaggregated data suggests, the results from expert survey data are more 
consistent with our hypothesis (H4) as it is confirmed with statistical significance for all 
the periods of analysis: 1999-2008, 2009-2017 and total (1999-2017). This shows that the 
greater ideological distance between SRLPs and their center-left competitors may be a 
possible explanation not only for a perceived greater radicalism of these parties, but also 
for the smaller number of government coalitions with social democrats in Southern 
European countries (compared to the Nordic countries). These results also reveal that the 
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ideological distance between SRLPs and SDs has increased between the 1999-2008 and 
the 2009-2017 periods, mainly due to a shift in SRLPs to more leftist positions in the 
economic left-right scale (this shift did not happen for SDs and NRLPs). This suggests a 
possible impact of the economic crisis and austerity measures on the polarization between 
the Southern European radical left and the social democratic parties of these countries 
(which is not the case for Nordic countries). This suggestion has been discussed in the 
previous sections. 
 
 
Figure 17b. Ideological distance to social democratic parties on the economic left-right. 
Comparative Manifesto Data (CMP). 
The levels of statistical significance of the t-test are: ***p < 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05; +p ≤ 0.1. 
 
Although the results from CHES confirm our hypothesis with statistical 
significance, the same does not happen for the CMP results (Figure 17b). In fact, in this 
dataset, NRLPs appear ideologically more distant from democratic social parties in at least 
two time periods. However, and since the CHES data confirms the direction of our 
hypothesis with statistical significance and the CMP results only refute it without statistical 
significance, according to our criterion, in this case we consider our hypothesis H4 as 
being partially confirmed. 
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Finally, and in addition to the partial confirmation of this hypothesis, it should be 
pointed out that one of the main conclusions of this section is that the most ‘radical’ RLPs 
in their national contexts are, in addition to the Greek KKE and the Portuguese PCP, the 
Portuguese BE, the Italian RC and the Danish EL, while the less ‘radical’ appear to be the 
Danish SF, the Finnish VAS, the Norwegian SV and the Swedish V. This can partially 
explain why the Southern European RLP can be perceived as being more radical, than the 
more ‘pragmatic’ Nordic Green Left (although some part of that perception eventually also 
has to do with their commitment to government participation). 
The greater relative ‘radicalism’ of RLPs (i.e. ideological distance to the political 
status-quo) may be due to the more radical positions they take, and to the more centrist 
positions adopted by the social democrats. But the fact is that ideological distance has not 
only consequences at the cooperation level between these parties and coalition formation – 
although this is no longer a problem in the case of ‘radical’ parties such as the Danish EL, 
the Italian RC or the Portuguese RLPs – but also (and perhaps above all) it has 
consequences in the public perception of a certain radicalism of each of these parties in the 
specific context of their countries. This argument would obviously need to be better 
developed and empirically supported, as well as the possible consequences that these 
ideological distances between RLPs and SDs may have on the specific political context of 
each country. In this case, we have in mind the Portuguese case in which, for many years, 
ideological distance was pointed out as one of the main reasons for the lack of 
governmental cooperation between the radical left (PCP and BE) and the major center-
left/social democratic party (PS) (March & Freire, 2012, pp. 218–225), thus appearing to 
be an important dimension of the ideological study of RLPs. 
 
  
5.4. Overview of results 
 
This chapter concludes with an overview of results, presenting a brief summary of 
the confirmation of our hypotheses and a series of visual maps with the current ideological 
positions of the RLPs that integrated this study. In this section, we make a series of more 
global considerations about the empirical results obtained in this dissertation and on the 
main ideological differences found between Nordic and Southern European RLPs.  
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Confirmation of hypotheses 
 Throughout this chapter, it was possible to realize that the great majority of our 
hypotheses did not find confirmation in the empirical results. Either because the datasets 
did not present concordant results among each other, or because the detected ideological 
differences did not find statistical significance. In the following table we present a brief 
summary of the final results for each of these hypotheses: 
 
Table 8. Hypothesis confirmation summary 
 
Hypotheses    
 CHES CMP Final Results 
Economic Left-Right dimension    
H1a: Southern RLPs take more leftist positions in the 
economic left-right dimension than Nordic RLPs. 
Yes (–) 
 
Yes (–) 
 
Suggested but 
not confirmed 
H1b: Southern RLPs have “re-radicalized” in the economic 
left-right dimension since the 2008 economic crisis. Yes No Not confirmed 
H1c: Southern RLPs give more emphasis to traditional 
socioeconomic issues than Nordic RLPs. Yes (+) No (+) Not confirmed 
New politics (GAL-TAN) dimension    
H2a: Nordic RLPs take more GAL 
(green/alternative/libertarian) positions in the GAL-TAN 
dimension than Southern RLPs. 
No (–) Yes (–) Not confirmed 
H2b: Nordic RLPs give greater emphasis to non-
socioeconomic issues than Southern RLPs. Yes (–) No (–) Not confirmed 
European integration dimension    
H3a: Nordic RLPs take stronger Eurosceptical positions in 
the European integration dimension than Southern European 
RLPs. 
Yes (–) Yes (–) Suggested but not confirmed 
H3b: Southern European RLPs have been taking more 
Eurosceptical positions in the European integration 
dimension since the 2008 economic crisis. 
Partially Yes Suggested but not confirmed 
Ideological distance    
H4: Nordic RLPs are ideologically closer to the major social 
democratic party of their countries in the economic left-right 
dimension than Southern European RLPs. 
Yes (+) No (–) Partially confirmed 
+ with statistical significance; – without statistical significance. 
 
In terms of the economic left-right dimension, the results did not confirm the 
hypothesis H1a but suggested that Southern European RLPs may indeed adopt more left-
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wing positions than Nordic RLPs, although this may be partly due to the particular 
contribution of the conservative communist parties. However, it has not been possible to 
confirm either a supposed economic re-radicalization of SRLPs since the economic crisis 
of 2008 (H1b), nor a greater emphasis given by the Southern European parties to 
socioeconomic issues when compared to the Nordic RLPs (H1c). 
In the hypotheses related to the new politics/GAL-TAN dimension, the results were 
contradictory across datasets. It was not at all possible to confirm the hypothesis that 
NRLPs take more libertarian positions (GAL) than SRLPs in this dimension (H2a), nor 
that this group of parties gives greater emphasis to non-socioeconomic issues (H2b), as 
suggested by our literature review. 
It was in the European Integration dimension where the differences between Nordic 
and Southern European RLPs appeared to be clearer. Although neither hypothesis has been 
fully confirmed due to lack of statistical significance, the results suggest that not only the 
Nordic RLPs are in general more Eurosceptic than SRLPs (H3a), but also that the latter 
have adopted more Eurosceptic positions since the beginning of 2008 the economic crisis 
that has so deeply affected their countries (H3b). 
Finally, and in terms of the ideological distances between RLPs and their social 
democratic adversaries, the results partially confirmed the hypothesis that the Southern 
European radical left is ideologically more distant from social democratic parties in terms 
of economic left-right dimension, with all the consequences that may arise from that fact, 
namely at the level of the perceptions on RLPs’ radicalism in their national party systems. 
However, although not all the results corresponded to our initial expectations, both 
the descriptive analysis and the comparative statistical analysis that were carried out 
allowed us to obtain relevant information on some of the main ideological differences 
between Nordic and Southern European RLPs and can be undoubtedly explored in the 
future. 
 
Visual mapping of the current ideological positioning of RLPs 
 In this last part of the discussion of our results, we map the party positions for the 
last period under analysis (2009-2017), in order to visually analyze the current ideological 
positioning of the RLPs in the three main ideological dimensions. We have gathered the 
results obtained from both the CHES and the CMP datasets, which also allows us to better 
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understand the usefulness of each method to distinguish between these two region-based 
groups of radical left parties. In these figures we also include the average results for social 
democratic parties (SDs) in order to allow us to verify to what extent each of these tools 
also allows a clear distinction between the two European party families. The analysis of 
these visual maps eventually leads us to some brief parallel reflections on some other 
aspects related to our research. 
 
 
Figure 18. Map of party positions on the economic left-right vs GAL-TAN. Expert survey data 
(CHES, 2009-2017). 
 
 In the results provided by CHES expert survey data (Figures 18 and 19), it is much 
easier to draw conclusions and distinguish the current positioning of the two European 
party families. Both radical left and social democratic parties have very well-defined areas 
in the three ideological dimensions of our study: SDs are positioned in the center-left of the 
economic left-right scale, assume moderate liberal positions on the GAL-TAN and are 
extremely pro-integration on the EU integration scale; on the other hand, RLPs take more 
radical left/liberal positions in the first two dimensions (except the conservative communist 
parties) and are on the neutral/anti-integration side of the European integration scale (for 
EU integration results, see Figure 19 below). 
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 When we compare the positions of Nordic and Southern European RLPs, we find 
that they fit perfectly into the same ideological space and share the same political family. 
However, there are some interesting differences that should be highlighted in these results: 
in most cases of the CHES results, it is the SRLPs who adopt more radical leftist/liberal 
positions on these two scales. This is even clearer if we consider that conservative 
communists are kind of special parties among SRLPs, especially in terms of the GAL-TAN 
scale (they are more conservative/TAN). Through these results, we can also confirm that 
the newly formed Spanish Podemos and the Italian SEL fit perfectly into the ideological 
spectrum of the European radical left – particularly that of the Southern European 
countries – and that their ideological classification as RLPs is therefore confirmed 
empirically, if any kind of doubt remained. 
 The results on the GAL-TAN scale (Figure 18) also raise the following question: is 
it not strange that the most ‘liberal’ social democratic parties are the Southern European 
when it is the Nordic societies that are traditionally known to be more liberal? We 
personally would expect the Swedish SAP or the Norwegian DNA to be the SDs that take 
more liberal positions on this scale, rather than the Italian PD or the Spanish PSOE. The 
answer to this question, however, would have to be answered empirically and would lead 
us to a reflection on the cross-national comparability of expert survey data. 
That leaves us with another important question about the CHES dataset: to what 
extent do the differences between SRLPs and NRLPs reflect their actual positions on 
policy issues and not a possible expert bias? That is, to what extent are the Spanish and 
Italian experts classifying the PD and the PSOE as ‘more liberal’ than the Nordic social 
democrats simply because this classification occurs in the specific context of their 
countries (more conservative), when that could not be so much the case if these parties 
were analyzed in the more liberal political context of a Nordic country, by a Nordic coder? 
Unfortunately, we do not know the answer to that question. 
In the European integration scale provided by CHES data (Figure 19) it is also 
possible to detect clear differences not only between SDs and RLPs, but also within the 
radical left itself. It is clear that the Greek KKE is an outlier in terms of positions regarding 
the European integration process (and the GAL-TAN), but we can see that the most 
Eurosceptic parties are three Nordic RLPs: the Danish EL, the Swedish V and the 
Norwegian SV. The Finnish VAS can be considered as some sort of Nordic outlier as it is  
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Figure 19. Map of party positions on the economic left-right vs European integration. Expert 
survey data (CHES, 2009-2017). 
 
consistently positioned differently (much more pro-integration) from the rest of the NRLPs 
in the European integration dimension. The Danish SF is a different case, since some 
authors no longer consider it to be a RLP since 2012 or 2014 (it is now closer to the 
European Green party family). However, as we have already pointed out in this chapter, 
we can almost identify the existence of two poles of Euroscepticism both within the Nordic 
and the Southern European radical left. In this case, the Spanish Podemos and the Italian 
SEL, once again, fit into the ideological positions of the more euro-enthusiast pole of the 
radical left party family. Let us then see if the same scenario repeats in the case of the 
Comparative Manifesto data. 
The first and most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the visual maps of the 
CMP results (Figures 20 and 21), is that they do not allow for such a clear distinction 
between the two European party families – the radical left and the social democrats – 
except perhaps in the case of the European integration dimension. The positions of RLPs 
and SDs in the economic left-right and GAL-TAN dimensions, overlap to a large extent 
and it is not uncommon to see some SD parties taking more leftist positions on 
socioeconomic issues than RLPs, for example (e.g. the Italian PD, the Swedish SAP). As it  
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Figure 20. Map of party positions on the economic left-right vs GAL-TAN. Comparative 
manifesto data (CMP, 2009-2017). 
 
is very unlikely that these results match the actual positioning of these parties, this should 
make us question the utility of this method to perform a comparison between the 
ideological differences between NRLPs and SRLPs (i.e. between parties of the same party 
family). Of course, it can be argued that social democratic parties could be more emphatic 
in defending left-wing economic policies in their manifestos. However, this explanation 
does not appear to be plausible since there is extensive literature cross-validating the 
results of comparative manifesto and expert survey data over the years. And if they don’t 
concur, it could also be the case that the CHES is wrong, and not necessarily the CMP. 
One of the explanations that seems to be more plausible to justify some of these 
(sometimes so significant) differences is related to some of the methodological choices we 
have made and the way we have applied the comparative manifesto dataset, which may not 
have been the most appropriate for our study. Not only are there many other ways of 
building ideological scales from the CMP dataset, but they also might have led to different 
results from the ones we got. These methodological issues would certainly deserve a more 
in-depth discussion and are already the subject of intense academic in this academic field, 
but they do not fit within the scope of this dissertation. 
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Figure 21. Map of party positions on the economic left-right vs European integration. Comparative 
manifesto data (CMP, 2009-2017). 
 
 In terms of the European integration dimension (Figure 21), CMP allows a clearer 
differentiation between RLPs and SDs, although their positions still overlap in many cases, 
which is not consistent neither with expert placements nor with countless studies on radical 
left parties’ Euroscepticism. The results obtained in this dimension may be due to the fact 
that it only uses two categories from the CMP dataset, when the other two economic left-
right and the GAL-TAN use 14 and 19, respectively. In any case, it is still interesting to 
note that comparative manifesto data identified the Greek KKE, the Portuguese PCP and 
the Norwegian SV as some of the most anti-EU radical left parties; and the Portuguese PS, 
the Spanish PSOE and the Italian PD as the most pro-European integration parties, which 
are pretty plausible results according to the literature. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
 
 
 The aim of this dissertation was to address and comparatively study the diversity of 
European radical left parties (RLPs). We conducted a cross-regional comparison between 
Nordic (NRLPs) and Southern European radical left parties (SRLPs) in order to evaluate to 
what extent their ideological differences find empirical support and allow for a region-
based ideological sub-classification of these two groups of parties. Data from comparative 
manifesto (CMP) and expert surveys (CHES) was used to compare and validate RLPs’ 
positions along the three main ideological dimensions of the European political space: the 
economic left-right, the GAL-TAN and the European integration dimensions. In addition, 
complementary analysis was made on the emphasis given by these parties to different 
policy issues and on their ideological distance to their main social democratic competitors 
(as a proxy for “radicalism”). 
 Before answering our research question – are there two different ideological 
subgroups of radical left parties, a Nordic and a Southern European one? – we need to 
refer some of the difficulties presented by the methodology approach that was used. Most 
of the time, the results provided by the two datasets were conflictive, making it very 
difficult to draw clear conclusions on the hypotheses that were advanced. Particularly in 
the case of the Comparative Manifesto dataset, the results were generally inconsistent over 
time and their wide variation made it difficult to make a descriptive analysis and compare 
these parties on the ideological scales that were constructed from the categories of this 
dataset. A cross-validation of the results was therefore not achieved most of the time. 
 The empirical findings of our study confirm that the ideological differences 
between RLPs are mostly noted in terms of their positions (issue positions) in the GAL-
TAN (i.e. non-socioeconomic issues) and European integration dimensions, and not so 
much on the economic left-right (i.e. socioeconomic issues). However, in the comparison 
between the two groups of RLPs, although it was not possible to consider any of the 
hypotheses as “confirmed”, it was possible to draw some conclusions on the economic left-
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right and European integration dimensions (although without statistically significance). 
These results suggest that RLPs from Southern Europe seem to take more leftist positions 
on socioeconomic issues and are less Eurosceptic than Nordic RLPs. In terms of the so-
called new politics/GAL-TAN dimension related to non-socioeconomic issues, no relevant 
differences are found between these two groups. But the group that seemed to consistently 
position distinctly from the remaining RLPs in most ideological dimensions was that of the 
conservative communists (the Greek KKE and the Portuguese PCP): they are the RLPs that 
usually adopt more leftist positions on the economic left-right, more conservative in the 
GAL-TAN and more anti-integration on the European integration dimension. Another 
interesting result, even if we found no evidence of an economic re-radicalization of SRLPs 
since the onset of the 2008 economic crisis, is the support for an ideological shift on the 
Euroscepticism of the Southern European radical since 2008. SRLPs seem to have adopted 
increasing Eurosceptical positions after this year, confirming that the crisis may have had 
an impact in their attitudes towards the EU, as their countries were the most affected by 
austerity (i.e. Southern European countries). 
 On the other hand, no conclusions can be made on the different emphasis given by 
each group of RLPs to economic and non-socioeconomic issues. These results were 
inconsistent across the two datasets and neither of our two hypotheses could be confirmed. 
In the case of the expert survey data, it was possible to find solid evidence (with statistical 
significance) that the Southern European RLPs give more salience to economic issues than 
Nordic RLPs; however, these results were contradicted by the CMP data which indicates 
(also with statistical significance) that the NRLPs devote more space of their electoral 
manifestos to socioeconomic issues. On the contrary, in non-socioeconomic issues, the 
differences between NRLPs and SRLPs do not seem to be relevant, except in the case of 
the conservative communists and the Cypriot AKEL, which seem to give little relevance to 
these issues. Empirical support was also found for the hypothesis that SRLPs are 
ideologically more distant than NRLPs to the social democratic parties of their countries 
(“partially confirmed”). This may be a possible explanation to why they are frequently 
perceived as being more radical in their national contexts, and to the lower number of 
coalition experiences between RLPs and SDs in Southern European countries. This 
ideological gap was expected to be particularly significant in the case of the conservative 
communists, but could only be confirmed in the CHES expert survey data. 
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 As we have described, the empirical findings of our research allow us to identify 
several important differences between Nordic and Southern European RLPs. Some of these 
are very relevant for a better understanding of the existing diversity within this party 
family. However, it was also possible to demonstrate that NRLPs and SRLPs essentially 
occupy the same ideological space (especially in the economic left-right scale), and that 
those differences may not be significant enough to consider the existence of two well-
defined region-based ideological subgroups of RLPs, as our research question formulated. 
In fact, we still find a variety of positions and exceptions even among each group: e.g. the 
Finnish VAS is much less Eurosceptical than the rest of the Nordic Green Left, and the 
Greek KKE is much more conservative than the remaining Southern European radical left. 
We thus conclude that there does not appear to be enough empirical evidence (yet) to 
positively answer the main research question of our work and that more empirical research 
is needed in order to draw different conclusions on this matter. 
In this chapter of the conclusions, we should also briefly reflect on the impact of 
some methodological decisions on our results. Perhaps we should begin by raising the 
question of whether the construction of our scales – based on Prosser’s (2014) – and the 
calculation method of the logit scale (Lowe et al., 2011) were the most adequate for our 
measurements. It is not possible to answer this question without a thorough methodological 
discussion, but we know that other types of scales could have also been tested and used for 
our measurements: Bakker & Hobolt (2013) consider that some issues have more 
relevance in certain countries and suggest the construction of specific scales for each 
country based on factor analysis; other authors have adapted specific scales for measuring 
and comparing some of the most specific characteristics of RLPs (e.g. Fagerholm, 2016; 
Gomez et al., 2016); and other have even used trend lines that are statistically “smoothed” 
rather than the exact calculations of party positions, in order to avoid the impact of the 
excessive positional variation of some datasets (e.g. Wagner & Meyer, 2017). Maybe the 
distinction between RLPs would be better identified using specific RLPs’ scales than more 
general ones, in order to focus into more radical left’s policy issues. Other possible 
solution can be the already existing attempts to correct expert bias by using ‘anchoring 
vignettes’, a method that helps to assure the cross-national comparability of expert surveys 
positioning (i.e. “whether a 7 in Sweden is a 7 in the United Kingdom” – Bakker et al., 
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2014, p. 2). All these methodological challenges have deserved a large academic attention 
and stimulated the debate in this area. This proves how difficult it is to reach consensus 
about the better solutions for measuring and comparing party positions across countries. In 
addition, the information that is gathered from measuring party positions can also be 
complemented with other sources of information such as voter and elite surveys, or even 
with the analysis of more qualitative data such as party official statements, elite interviews 
or even parliamentary speeches. 
The analysis of our results and the confirmation of our hypotheses, tell us two 
things about the main conclusions of this work: first, that although Nordic and Southern 
European RLPs occupy the same ideological space – as we mentioned above – it is still 
possible to identify differences that suggest some distinct ideological traits among RLPs, 
even though they may not be sufficient to consider the existence of two distinct region-
based ideological subgroups of RLPs – a Nordic and a Southern European. Second, that 
the fact that we are trying to measure ideological differences in parties that belong to the 
same (ideological) party family naturally has its problems, since we are using instruments 
commonly used to distinguish between different party families. This leads us to conclude 
that in order to better compare the ideological differences between RLPs, we can not use in 
the same way the existing empirical methods and need, at least, more precise instruments 
adapted to the study of the most characteristic ideological traits of the European radical left 
parties. 
The contribution of this work for the literature is therefore twofold: first, it helped 
to clarify some of the ideological differences between RLPs, which were often referred to 
by some works but had not been empirically tested. This dissertation gives a small 
contribution to fill this gap in the radical left literature and to extend the knowledge on the 
diversity of the European radical left party family. It also integrated newly-formed RLPs 
into the existing frameworks, such as the Spanish Podemos and the Italian SEL (now part 
of the Sinistra Italiana), demonstrating that they fit into the ideological spectrum of the 
European radical left and confirming the consistency of their classification as RLPs. 
Second, it applied two of the most widely used datasets for measuring party positions, 
allowing us to verify to what extent they present similar results for the same parties in the 
same periods of time (which they did not, most of time). For these and the above 
mentioned reasons, we are confident that our purpose of contributing to extend the 
  96	
knowledge on the ideological positions of RLPs was accomplished. Future studies can 
continue to extend this knowledge either through the analysis of new ideological 
dimensions that are still under-researched on RLPs (e.g. the degrees of populism, anti-
elitism and anti-globalization sentiments), the study of how several policy issues have been 
incorporated into each party’s ideology over time (e.g. environmental protection, LGBT 
rights, etc.), or simply by going beyond the mere analysis of their ideological differences 
and focusing on the study of other features such as their organizational differences and 
behavioral strategies. 
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